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Abstract
Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the
nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to
regard a system’s quantum state |ψ〉 merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret
it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We
here investigate recent developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state
|ψ〉 and has its roots in Einstein’s views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of a concrete model that has
been considered to serve as evidence for an epistemic view of the envisioned kind, as well as specific no-go results and
their import. It will be argued that while an epistemic account of the particular kind is not straightforwardly ruled out
by the no-go results, they demonstrate that the evidential character of the model(s) discussed rests on a rather shaky
foundation, and that they make some achievements widely recognized in the literature appear worthy of doubt.
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1. Introduction
Quantum mechanics (QM), construed broadly, is the
scientific theory with the greatest practical impact and
predictive success (cf. e.g. [2, p. 116] or [3, p. 893] for
examples), and yet to date it is still faced with the infa-
mous measurement problem (MP) – the problem that the
unitary time evolution allows for and preserves superpo-
sition states and thus provides no dynamics that lead to
definite outcomes in measurement procedures – and with
related issues, all ultimately rooted in quantum superpo-
sition. Dirac [4, p. 7] and von Neumann [5, p. 217] his-
torically attempted to solve the MP by adding the projec-
tion postulate (PP) to the theory, which says that when
observable A is measured on system S in state |ψ(t)〉, the
state of S undergoes a sudden change |ψ〉 −→ Pˆa|ψ〉‖Pˆa|ψ〉‖ with
probability | 〈a|ψ(t)〉 |2. Here Pˆa = |a〉〈a| is the projection
operator onto the subspace spanned by |a〉, so upon con-
clusion of this process, the sate of the system is the (nor-
malized) eigenstate |a〉 of A. In modern QM, this theme
readily generalizes1 to Lu¨ders’ rule ρˆ −→ MˆmρˆMˆ†m
Tr(MˆmρˆMˆ
†
m)
,
where ρˆ =
∑
j λj |ψj〉〈ψj | is the system’s density matrix
1This is not to say that Lu¨ders’ rule is the general rule to de-
scribe state transformations; it rather “characterizes just one (albeit
distinguished) form of state change that may occur in appropriately
designed measurements of a given observable with a discrete spec-
trum.” [6, p. 356]
that may represent a mixed quantum state (in case there
are two λj 6= λk which are both unequal to zero), and
where {Mˆ†mMˆm}m∈I (I some indexing set) is some more
general positive operator valued measure (POVM). Many
POVMs result from coarse-graining projector valued mea-
sures (PVMs) [7, p. 3], and this “may or may not admit
the kind of ignorance interpretation familiar from classi-
cal physical experimentation.” [ibid.] The use of mixed
states implies that no pure quantum state is assigned even
beforehand, and (despite the non-uniqueness of decompo-
sition of a mixed state) in particular cases this may be
understood as an expression of the fact that the ‘true’
quantum state is simply unknown [cf. e.g. 8, p. 20]. To
that extent generalized measurements may smell like epis-
temic uncertainties being crucially involved in measure-
ments in QM, and state changes being ‘merely informa-
tional’ in some sense. It is not clear though that these
considerations carry over to other types of measurement
(or even to all generalized measurements), and on account
of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, i.e., that an observable A
has value a on a system S iff the state of S is given by
an eigenvector |a〉 of the operator Aˆ representing A, the
‘sudden change’ mentioned above would clearly have to be
interpreted differently.
The traditional Dirac-von Neumann approach has evi-
dently raised many questions as to what even constitutes
a measurement though, and it has (among other things)
spawned off fanciful interpretations in which conscious ob-
servation has a direct impact on physical reality (cf. [9];
[10]). Of course today we have a whole range of alter-
native responses to the MP such as the may worlds in-
terpretation, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse the-
ories... and what have you, all with their particular vices
and virtues. There is, however, one particular response
that sticks out in its ‘naturalness’, and it is certainly en-
dorsed in some form or other by “[t]he philosopher in the
street, who has not suffered a course in quantum mechan-
ics” (Bell’s phrase [11]) and, we may add, by many a
physicist in the lab who has not concerned himself with
the foundations of QM. This response is to deprive even
pure quantum states of their ontological significance, and
to construe the theory not as a description of the behavior
of physical systems, but rather as a representation of the
knowledge an actual or ideal observer or agent can have
about these. On such a view, the need for an instanta-
neous reduction of the state vector upon certain kinds of
‘measurement-like’ interactions is removed at once, and
the ‘collapse’ appearing in the PP indeed comes out just
a sort of informational update for the experimenter upon
registration of a given result.
Interpretations of this general sort are typically called
epistemic or ψ-epistemic. However, one can spell out an
epistemic interpretation in multiple different ways, with
strongly diverging underlying assumptions. Leifer for in-
stance maintains that
it is important to distinguish two kinds of ψ-
epistemic interpretation. The most popular
type are those variously described as anti-realist,
instrumentalist, or positivist. [...] The second
type of ψ-epistemic interpretation are those that
are realist, in the sense that they do posit some
underlying ontology. They just deny that the
wavefunction is part of that ontology. Instead,
the wavefunction is to be understood as repre-
senting our knowledge of the underlying reality,
in the same way that a probability distribution
on phase space represents our knowledge of the
true phase space point occupied by a classical
particle. [12, p. 72]
We are here concerned with epistemic interpretations
of the second type in Leifer’s classification, the kind of in-
terpretation of quantum states which is realist in a decisive
sense and arguably strives for as much preservation of com-
mon sense as possible. The decisive sense of realism here
is at least a metaphysical or external one, meaning that
“[t]he world is (largely) made up of objects that are mind-,
language-, and theory-independent.” [13, p. 8] According
to such a realism, there should be no doubt that every
system always has a unique, definite state, a unique way
of how it ‘actually is’, despite our ignorance of this ‘actual
how’. This should also—a slightly stronger assumption—
at least in principle enable us to give a unequivocal de-
scription of that definite state. The ‘weirdness’ that QM
is notoriously associated with is just an expression of our
inability to properly access the true states of certain (typ-
ically microscopic) systems, and hence it vanishes when
properly construed in terms of incomplete knowledge.
2. Einstein’s Views and Hidden Variables
A central tenet underlying this type of epistemic inter-
pretation is that QM is in fact an incomplete theory that
will (hopefully) be replaced by a more complete and com-
prehensive one in the future. This assumption surfaced
early on when the peculiar features of QM became ap-
parent, and its most prominent proponent was, of course,
Einstein. This is most vividly reflected in his 1939 corre-
spondence with Schro¨dinger, where he writes:
I am as convinced as ever that the wave rep-
resentation of matter is an incomplete repre-
sentation of the state of affairs, no matter how
practically useful it has proved itself to be. The
prettiest way to show this is by your example
with the cat (radioactive decay with an explo-
sion coupled to it.) At a fixed time parts of the
ψ-function correspond to the cat being alive
and other parts to the cat being pulverized.
If one attempts to interpret the ψ-function as a
complete description of a state, independent of
whether or not it is observed, then this means
that at the time in question the cat is neither
alive nor pulverized. But one or the other sit-
uation would be realized by making an obser-
vation.
If one rejects this interpretation then one must
assume that the ψ-function does not express
the real situation but rather that it expresses
the contents of our knowledge of the situation.
[14, p. 43]
Due to Einstein’s brave advocacy of these views, we
here coin the kind of epistemic interpretation in question
Einstein epistemic (EE). Due to Bohr’s immortal influ-
ence on the other sort of epistemic interpretation (the first
kind in Leifer’s classification), we will call it Bohr epis-
temic (BE), in contrast. We emphasize that an EE account
need not encompass all of Einstein’s views on the quan-
tum state; we here merely use his core intuition, that “the
ψ-function does not express the real situation but rather
[...] the contents of our knowledge” to form a label.2
Ironically, young Heisenberg also spoke merely of a “de-
struction of the knowledge of a particle’s momentum by an
apparatus determining its position” [15, p. 21; my empha-
sis – FB], and while he himself went on to develop onto-
logically more charged philosophical views of the quantum
2It will be interesting though to discuss at least to some extent
which of Einstein’s intuitions can or cannot not be preserved.
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state, according to an EE view this is basically all there is
to most if not all of QM’s weirdnesses.
But how does one spell out such an EE view in detail?
Einstein’s writings are often associated with an ensemble
interpretation of quantum states because of his continuing
appeal to statistical ensembles, as witnessed, e.g., in his
reply to criticisms in Schlipp’s volume on his life and work
[cf. 16, p. 668], or in his 1936 Physics and Reality, where
he writes: “The ψ-function does not in any way describe a
condition which could be that of a single system; it relates
rather to many systems, to ‘an ensemble of systems’ in the
sense of statistical mechanics.” [17, p. 375]
While there remains some controversy over what Ein-
stein’s use of the word ‘ensemble’ actually entailed (cf.
[18]; [19, p. 239 ff.]), a more explicit view of this kind was
later defended and extended by Ballentine, who describes
it in the following terms:
For example, the system may be a single elec-
tron. Then the ensemble will be the concep-
tual (infinite) set of all single electrons which
have been subjected to some state preparation
technique (to be specified for each state), gen-
erally by interaction with a suitable appara-
tus. Thus a momentum eigenstate (plane wave
in configuration space) represents the ensem-
ble whose members are single electrons each
having the same momentum, but distributed
uniformly over all positions. [20, p. 361]
The “state preparation technique” must in fact rather
be viewed as an equivalence class thereof [cf. 7, p. 5], since
it is possible to use either a calcite crystal or a grid po-
larizer, say, to prepare a photon in a certain polarization
state, and since different sets of preparation procedures
can be used to prepare the same mixed state.
It may not be immediately obvious why this view of the
quantum state should count as ‘epistemic’, but it is obvious
from the above quote that at least Einstein was aiming for
an epistemic interpretation. He may, in fact, have equally
had in mind an ideal or conceptual ensemble, as suggested
in Ballentine’s quote, construed as a cognitive tool for de-
termining probabilities of experimental outcomes. This is
also the viewpoint of Harrigan and Spekkens [21, p. 150]
who think that “the ensembles Einstein mentions are sim-
ply a manner of grounding talk about the probabilities
that characterize an observer’s knowledge [...]” and sim-
ilarly of Bartlett et al. [22, p. 4] who believe that “the
thesis that quantum states describe the statistical proper-
ties of a virtual ensemble of systems [...] is equivalent to
saying that it describes one’s limited information about a
single system drawn from the ensemble.”
But what exactly do these ensembles consist of? They
cannot consist of conceptual electrons (say) in the sense
of QM, because all QM assigns is the state vector which
does not—and cannot—attribute definite values for all ob-
servables at all times. So the conceptual ensembles must
consist of something else, something not exhaustively de-
scribed by QM, but only by some set of additional hidden
variables.
Epistemic hidden variable approaches of course have a
long history in QM as well, and they are the most explicit
version of the general contention that QM is incomplete
and that there are additional features in nature, more in
line with the concepts of classical physics and everyday
life thinking (cf. also [23, p. xvii ff.]). The assumption
of hidden variables is also clearly presupposed by ensem-
ble approaches such as Ballentine’s, as is evident from
Whitaker’s analysis of them:
[I]f the wave-function of a free particle is an
eigenfunction of momentum, all members of
the ensemble will have the corresponding value
of momentum, but in addition each has a pre-
cise value of position, though these values will
all be different. The values of position must be
called hidden variables, because they are not
related to the wave-function. [19, p. 210-211]
In fact, all meaningful ensemble interpretations of QM
have to assume hidden variables (as has also been cogently
pointed out by Home and Whitaker [24, p. 263 ff.] and
d’Espagnat [25, p. 297 ff.]). But there is also the rather
trivial sense in which the term ‘ensemble’ plays a role in
QM proper: since QM is concerned with probabilistic pre-
dictions, the state function must always also be allowed
to refer to an entire ensemble of equally prepared systems
[cf. 23, p. 6]. If QM is considered to be complete however,
then ψ should be taken to represent, at the same time, the
state of an individual system, which is decidedly not the
case with probability distributions (or densities) used in
classical statistical mechanics.
The traditional ensemble interpretations are conceptu-
ally revisionary in this sense, in enforcing a break with
the assumptions underlying orhtodox QM. But they are
formally conservative: QM as it is may serve as a formal
tool for devising statistical predictions; the possibility of a
more complete physical theory endorsing hidden variables
in a formally explicit sense is merely left open or hoped
for.
There are, however, well known reasons why such for-
mally conservative epistemic interpretations never really
took off. Schro¨dinger [26, p. 156],3 for instance, started
developing counter-examples early on. One of his exam-
ples was a harmonic oscillator with a given fixed value of
total energy ((n+ 12 )~ω for some fixed n, say). In the cor-
responding quantum state of the system, an eigenstate of
energy, there would be a large uncertainty as to the os-
cillators position x. But according to an ensemble view,
kinetic and potential energy, depending on velocity and
position respectively, should be well defined at all times
3Cf. also [19, p. 214] for a more detailed analysis of Schro¨dinger’s
examples.
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for each individual member of the ensemble (or rather:
the physical objects referred to), whence there should be
a clear cut-off value for the position. To see this, con-
sider that the potential energy increases with position x
in the oscillator potential, and kinetic energy (increasing
with velocity) cannot be negative (i.e., the oscillator does
not ‘less than not move’), so that the limit (n + 12 )~ω in
total energy implies a limit for possible positions. But QM
of course predicts non-vanishing probabilities for positions
beyond that limit.
Similar worries are raised by quantum tunneling. In
α-decay, an α-particle has to tunnel through the Coulomb
barrier of the nucleus in order to be emitted. This escape
is impossible in a classical physical scenario, since the par-
ticle would have to have greater potential than total en-
ergy at some point, which again implies negative kinetic
energies [cf. 19, pp. 214-215].
And finally, arguments that appeal to quantum inter-
ference are typically invoked, since a simple statistical par-
ticle interpretation does not predict the observed interfer-
ence patterns in double slit experiments and the like. Only
the incorporation of an active part of the diaphragm (and
possible detectors behind both slits) may raise hopes for a
suitable statistical analysis in terms of ensembles. Nothing
of this sort is present in the formally conservative ensemble
interpretations.
In summary, what these and many further examples
show is “how far away from the basic [...] ensemble one
has to go – [...] as Bohr would have stressed, one must
include the measuring device as an active participator in
the measurement, not just a recorder of a fixed value.” [19,
p. 217] And the failure to do so may be seen as the major
crux of the historical ensemble approaches.
3. Formal Revisions and Epistemic Models
Modern epistemic approaches in fact do use a revised
formal inventory, including the possibility for an active
part of the measuring device in producing the outcome
statistics. From this, they can prima facie successfully
reproduce many predictions peculiar to QM from merely
epistemic restrictions – including examples of the infamous
quantum interference phenomena.
A particularly influential formal framework that allows
to formulate an epistemic view of quantum states in more
detail, developed originally by Spekkens [27] and extended
in joint work with N. Harrigan [21], and very much like (if
not an instance of) the formalism used by Bell [28], is that
of the so called ontological models (OMs).
3.1. The Ontological Models-Approach: General Outline
To define what an OM is, Harrigan and Spekkens pre-
suppose an operationalistic understanding of QM, which in
their words means that “the primitives of description are
simply preparation and measurement procedures – lists of
instructions of what to do in the lab” [21, p. 128], and they
contend that the goal of this operational formulation is
just to determine outcome probabilities for measurement
procedures. In contrast, the primitives of description in
an OM for this operational theory are the properties of
microscopic systems (ibid.).
To match the operational reading with the quantum
formalism, they associate a preparation procedure P with
a density operator ρˆ (whereas Spekkens [27, p. 3], more
accurately, associates an equivalence class of such with
ρˆ) and a measurement M with a POVM {Eˆj}j∈J . But
how, precisely, do we have to understand the ‘association’?
What exactly does the quantum state represent about the
system? The preparation procedure itself (or rather: its
equivalence class)? That which results from it? A virtual
ensemble in the sense of section 2? In contrast to Harrigan
and Spekkens, Busch et al., for instance, write: “Any type
of physical system is characterised by means of a collec-
tion of preparation procedures, the application of which
prepare the system in a state T . The set of states is taken
to be convex, thus accounting for the fact that different
preparation procedures can be combined to produce mix-
tures of states.” [7, p. 5, emphasis in original] Here the
state is named in addition to the collection of preparation
procedures, as that which results from them. We will here
hence make sense of the association as follows: The quan-
tum state ρˆ of a given system is the state of the system
according to its preparation, whence we may read the word
‘state’ in a decidedly non-ontological fashion: it does not
represent how the system actually is, but rather what can
be said about it, in virtue of what was done to it. ρˆ may
of course be a pure state and correspond to an eigenstate
of some operator, whence the eigenvalue-eigenstate link is
clearly severed in this approach.
Outcomes in projective measurements, however, can
be identified with (pure) quantum states as well, whence
quantum states should also be allowed to represent ‘states
according to measurement’. Notably, this reading fits well
with the general operationalism about QM, since the mea-
surement is also an operation performed on the system
and generally not so much different from the preparation
procedure (think of a Stern-Gerlach measurement, where
both preparation and measurement involve magnets and
screens). Indeed, we thus preserve half of the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link, i.e. that when an observable A is measured
to have value a on S, the state of S is given by |a〉—though
only in the operational reading of ‘state’.
In accord with our analysis, we will, in what follows,
occasionally call ρˆ (or ψ) the P/M-state of a system. Given
this understanding of quantum states, Born’s rule provides
a probability PrρˆM (k) = Tr(Eˆkρˆ) of obtaining value k in a
measurement procedure of type M given some preparation
procedure resulting in ρˆ, i.e., with the meanings of the
indices of the probability function loosened.
To define the notion of an OM, Harrigan and Spekkens
now introduce further formal inventory. The first ingredi-
ent is a state space Λ with elements λ, termed ontic states.
These ontic states are supposed to represent a “complete
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specification of the properties of a system [...].” [21, p. 128]
Talk of ‘ontic’ states, however, seems somewhat clumsy,
whence we will prefer to speak of true states instead, i.e.
states which are true of the systems under consideration,
in a correspondence theoretic understanding of truth. This
is what the OM approach (obviously) aims for.
In addition to the space of true states λ, two proba-
bility densities are defined. The first one is termed epis-
temic state, and is intended to reflect the knowledge a
possible observer might have about the λ ∈ Λ. Hence it
corresponds to a conditional probability p(λ|ρˆ) or pρˆ(λ)
of obtaining a certain true state λ, conditional on having
prepared P-state ρˆ. The second one, denoted by p(k|λ,M)
or ξkM (λ), is called an indicator- or response function,
4 and
it is supposed to reflect uncertainties in a given measure-
ment M leading to outcome k, conditional on the fact that
state λ obtains on a system [27, 21].
To formally connect the probabilities occurring in the
OM approach to the quantum probabilities, Harrigan and
Spekkens [21, p. 128] require that an OM must respect the
constraint ∫
dλ ξkM (λ)pρˆ(λ) = Tr(Eˆkρˆ), ∀ρˆ,M (1)
to be a model of QM. That is: adding up (integrating) all
the probabilities of obtaining a given outcome k, given a
certain measurement M and true state λ, weighted by the
probability that the state λ even occurs after having pre-
pared ρˆ, must reproduce the quantum probabilities.5 This
fully defines what an ontological model is,6 the state space
Λ, the epistemic state and the response function, and the
connection to QM given by formula (1). Hence ‘ontological
model’ should be read here rather as a technical term; not
much ontology is actually conveyed. The OM approach
provides a formal framework for analyzing different inter-
pretations of QM, and sketches a road to modifications of
QM’s formalism which allow for the specification of an on-
tology in which the quantum state does not figure, or at
least not fundamentally. It does not yet provide such an
ontology.
Ipso facto, we are here dealing with an explicit hid-
den variables-approach, the true states λ being the hidden
variables. Generally λ need not be interpreted as a hidden
variable though, since it can be interpreted as the quantum
state ψ itself—the OM-approach is formally neutral on
this point. In fact, Harrigan and Spekkens [21, p. 129 ff.]
4Response functions in statistical mechanics need not be normal-
ized, and therefore need not be interpretable as probability densities
in general. In the present context, we assume this to be the case
though, in accord with the literature on the subject studied here.
5For the mathematically inclined, measure theoretic generaliza-
tions can be found in [12, p. 82].
6In [27], the possibility of including a transformation matrix
Γ(λ, λ′) in (1) is discussed, to the end of analyzing the notion of
contextuality within the OM approach. We will not dedicate much
attention the these here though, since contextuality is not a major
subject of the paper.
draw a multifold distinction between classes of OMs (cf.
figure 1), with a dichotomy of ψ-onitc and ψ-epistemic
models. Intuitively this means that the quantum state can
either be construed as something that actually pertains to
real, mind-independent systems, or instead something we
ascribe to those systems only in virtue of our lack of knowl-
edge about their true states. Within the first category they
again distinguish ψ-supplemented from ψ-complete mod-
els, where the former category simply consists of OMs in
which the quantum state is something that pertains to
reality, but still not all there is. Intuitively, Bohmian Me-
chanics is an example of such a ‘model’, though it is not
clear that it formally fits the approach [cf. 29]. The notion
of ψ-complete models should now be self-explaining. For
obvious reasons, ψ-epistemic and ψ-supplemented models
are jointly termed ψ-incomplete.
To get a hold on the more precise definitions of the dif-
ferent subclasses of models, it is sufficient to look into the
definitions Harrigan and Spekkens provide for ψ-onticity
and ψ-completeness, as the other concepts can be stated
in terms of negations of these.
Definition (ψ-completeness). An ontological model is ψ-
complete if the space of true states Λ is isomorphic to the
projective Hilbert space P(H) (the space of rays of Hilbert
space) and if every preparation procedure Pψ associated
in quantum theory with a given ray ψ is associated in the
OM with a Dirac delta function centered at the true state
λψ that is the value of ψ in the isomorphism, pψ(λ) =
δ(λ− λψ).7
Put frankly, this definition tells us that an OM is ψ-
complete in case it reproduces QM tout court. The true
states in Λ are bijectively mapped onto rays in Hilbert
space, and the probability of a true state obtaining, given
a preparation procedure associated with a ray inH, is such
that it is 1 for the true state that is the value of the ray in
the isomorphism, and zero for all other true states. The
quantum statistics is reproduced in a trivial fashion.
As we saw, the notion of ψ-onticity is supposed to allow
for supplementation of ψ by elements of the model which
do not simply mirror elements of QM, whence a ψ-ontic
model is defined as follows.
Definition (ψ-onticity). An ontological model is ψ-ontic
if for any pair of preparation procedures, Pψ and Pφ, as-
sociated with distinct quantum states ψ and φ, we have
pψ(λ)pφ(λ) = 0 for all λ.
8
In other words, the supports of two epistemic states
that are conditional on two different procedures for prepar-
ing distinct P-states should not overlap (on sets of non-
zero measure). Now ψ-ontic models which do not satisfy
7Cf. [21, p. 131]. We have slightly altered the wording in the
definition, as Harrigan and Spekkens call λψ and ψ isomorphic, but
it is meaningless to talk of elements of spaces as ‘isomorphic’. The
appeal to projective space Hilbert space here is due to the invariance
of quantum states under multiplication by a global phase.
8Cf. [21, ibid].
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Figure 1: Classification of OMs according to the status of the
quantum state.
the first definition are called ψ-supplemented, non-ψ-ontic
models are called ψ-epistemic. The decisive criterion for
a model to be ψ-epistemic is hence that there be an over-
lap in (the supports of) the epistemic states associated
with distinct quantum states. The intuition being that, if
it may happen that λ is really the case in two instances,
and we have prepared for ψ in the one and for φ in the
other, then ψ and φ themselves do not reflect something
pertaining to the system. Given that the probability dis-
tributions pρˆ(λ) were supposed to represent “what can be
known and inferred by observers” [21, p. 129], this can be
translated more crisply into the statement that one can-
not know/infer for sure that a given λ is not sometimes
the case when one prepares for ψ, and sometimes when
one prepares for φ.
Note that sometimes modifications to the definition of
ψ-epistemicity are discussed [e.g. 30] such that an overlap
is only required for non-orthogonal states, since two or-
thogonal states |φ〉 , |ψ〉 may be construed as indicative of
mutually exclusive preparation procedures that could ar-
guably result in mutually exclusive sets of true states, or
even that all non-orthogonal states should be associated
with overlaps [e.g. 31]. We here however stick to the def-
inition given above, and the negation of ψ-onticity here
merely implies the existence of two such distinct (possi-
bly non-orthogonal) states that have distributions associ-
ated to them with overlapping supports. This is a com-
paratively weak requirement, and refinements in terms of
distance measures between the epistemic states have also
been proposed (see e.g. [32, p. 477]; [33, p. 2]).
Again, we find justification for associating this kind of
epistemic interpretation with Einstein, since the idea of
demonstrating the incompleteness of QM in virtue of the
existence of two ψ functions that correspond to the same
real physical state of an object at the same time was also
explicitly advocated by him:9 “[...] coo¨rdination of several
ψ functions with the same physical condition of [some]
system [...] shows [...] that the function cannot be inter-
preted as a (complete) description of a physical condition
9This is also a key reason why Harrigan and Spekkens [21] devote
a large part of their paper to Einstein’s views of the quantum state.
of a unit system.” [17, p. 376] We repeat, however, that
the OM approach in general merely constitutes a formal
framework for analyzing different interpretations of QM
or of the quantum state. Here we are only interested in
the approach to the extent that it can accommodate the
intuitions underlying an EE view, i.e.: we are here only
concerned with ψ-epistemic models, and we take them to
be a suitable implementation of an EE view.
3.2. Interlude: The Philosophical Issues at Stake
What is at stake in the present discussion of the quan-
tum state? In fact, there is a whole range of topics that
could be picked out, but we will focus on three concerns
and how they relate to the debate.
The search for ‘completeness’ is our first concern, and it
raises some first worries as regard the definitions at hand.
Recall that λ was supposed to correspond to a “complete
specification of the properties of a system[...].” But on a
broad reading of ‘property’ this seems rather impossible.
For suppose that we have prepared for ψ in the one case
and φ in the other, and that in both cases λ is supposed
to occur. Then we can say that there is a (complex) rela-
tional property of being-in-a-Pψ-situation in the first case,
and a relational property of being-in-a-Pφ-situation in the
second, and hence, λ cannot strictly specify all properties.
Bell, whose work has certainly served as a paradigm
for the OM approach (as noted above), more cautiously
talked about a “more complete specification”, for which
it is “a matter of indifference [...] whether λ denotes a
single variable or a set, or even a set of functions, and
whether the variables are discrete or continuous.” [28,
p. 15; my emphasis – FB] Clearly Harrigan and Spekkens
must have in mind a particular set of physical or natu-
ral properties; kinematical quantities comparable to those
arising from the phase space formalism in classical mechan-
ics, i.e. all (and only) those properties that can be defined
in terms of (generalized) positions and momenta. Ruetsche
[34, p. 31] in fact makes a point in our favor, in iden-
tifying generalized coordinates and momenta as paradig-
matic examples of magnitudes she calls “fundamental in
the physicist’s sense,” meaning that it is usually assumed
that the value of every other magnitude pertaining to a
system can be determined by assigning values to these on
the system. The ‘completeness’ sought for by Harrigan
and Spekkens must consist in seeking such fundamental-
in-the-physicist’s-sense quantities. Quantum mechanically
the closest analogy is the complete set of comeasurable ob-
servables. But since these of necessity only include a sub-
set of all conceivable observables, the contention (again)
is that there must be other, hitherto undiscovered magni-
tudes beyond QM’s observables that are more in line with
the classical description.
But one should ask what actually singles out such a
set of properties, beyond their usefulness for the applica-
bility of a given theory. How can we get hold of a preferred
set of ‘natural’ physical properties which ‘carve nature at
its joints’, as it were, and suffice to completely describe a
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system in an ontologically privileged way? As regards use-
fulness, QM proper arguably has quite an edge in the light
of all its predictive and technological successes—despite its
lack of definite descriptions similar to the those occurring
in classical theories. So seeking completeness in more than
a theory-internal sense first of all requires a sensible crite-
rion for naturalness of properties.
Besides the completeness-issues, a second point to won-
der is what concept(s) of probability are involved in ψ-
epistemic models. This is a point which Harrigan and
Spekkens refrain from elucidating, as they “do not feel that
the distinction [between different concepts of probability
– FB] is significant in this context [...].” [21, p. 150] This
distinction may not be as insignificant as they apparently
believe though, since (famously) there is a whole host of
radically differing views of probability, and opting for one
particular view always comes with rather deep ontological
and epistemological implications. Possibly the broadest
dichotomy one can draw is that between epistemic and
objective probabilities [cf. e.g. 35, p. 2], and on this coarse
level the classification of the epistemic state seems pretty
clear. But as regards the response function, matters are
more subtle. Harrigan and Spekkens here have it that “the
model may be such that the ontic state λ determines only
the probability p(k|λ,M) of different outcomes k for the
measurement M .” [21, p. 128; my emphasis – FB] And
this smells like the response function involving objective
probability. But in fact they also claim that “p(λ|P ) and
p(k|λ,M) specify what can be known and inferred by ob-
servers” [21, p. 129; my emphasis – FB], which prima fa-
cie conflicts the previous quote. But remember that their
claim merely was that an (epistemic) OM leaves it open
whether (“may be such that”) λ determines only outcome
probabilities for values k in measurement M . And if there
is indeed a random response of the measurement device to
the true states fed in, then it is, of course, also the case
that only a probability for a given outcome can be known
or inferred by an observer.
For the purposes of an epistemic model, one might
still be inclined to hope for an interpretation of the re-
sponse function according to which randomized responses
“could occur because of our failure to take into account the
precise ontological configurations of either [preparation or
measurement]” [36, p. 4], or simply reflect an “unknown
disturbance” [37, p. 10; my emphasis – FB] of the sys-
tem caused by the measurement—much like Heisenberg’s
elimination of knowledge due to the measurement process.
However, taking both probabilities to be epistemic in this
sense could, firstly, be fleshed out to yield a kind of mi-
crodeterminism, meaning that on a sufficiently fine-grained
scale of observation (accessible only to Laplacian demons,
as it were), no probabilities would be needed. This would
take the debate to a whole other level though, since cur-
rently the central question is one of microdefiniteness (the
existence of additional true states which explain the mea-
surement statistics), not determinism. And secondly, we
saw that a failure to take the role of the measurement de-
vice into account was the main reason for the failure of
the historical (ensemble) approaches, so regarding the re-
sponse function as merely reflecting epistemic uncertain-
ties may not be good advice after all, or at least raises
further concerns.
Leifer [12, p. 70], moreover, notes that “calling a proba-
bility density ‘epistemic’ [...] presupposes a broadly Bayes-
ian interpretation of probability theory in which probabil-
ities represent an agent’s knowledge, information, or be-
liefs.” But ‘broadly Bayesian’ may still be too broad in
this context, since there is also the quantum Bayesian ap-
proach, which explicitly endorses subjective Bayesianism
and refrains from entertaining (formally explicit) hidden
variables. Consider Williamson’s [38, p. iii] characteri-
zation of the distinction between subjective and objec-
tive Bayesianism: “Subjective Bayesians hold that it is
largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which
degrees of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the
other hand, maintain that appropriate degrees of belief
are largely (though not entirely) determined by the agent’s
evidence.” Moreover, Williamson characterizes objective
Bayesianism as a normative theory, i.e., a theory which
claims that “[t]he strengths of an agent’s beliefs should
behave like probabilities[...].” [38, p. 1; my emphasis –
FB]
Prima facie ψ-epistemic models, in which the epis-
temic state quantifies what can be known and inferred
by observes, are best construed as embracing an objec-
tive Bayesian reading of probabilities. But upon closer in-
spection, they also appear compatible equally with what
Williamson [38, p. 15] refers to as empirically based subjec-
tive Bayesianism. All forms of Bayesianism, Williamson
(ibid.) tells us, hold a Probability norm, meaning that
“one’s degrees of belief at a particular time must be prob-
abilities if they are to be considered rational.” Empirically
based subjective Bayesians add a Calibration norm, i.e.
that “one’s degrees of belief [...] should also be calibrated
with known frequencies.” (ibid.) Because the epistemic
state is supposed to reflect what can be known and in-
ferred by an observer (agent) – on the basis of evidence
about preparation methods, and the presumed range of
true states which can result from each preparation – we can
see that the attribution of probabilities must be on the ba-
sis of known frequencies, and the Calibration norm should
clearly hold for ψ-epistemic models. Objective Bayesians
additionally assume an Equivocation norm, meaning that
“one’s degrees of belief at a particular time are rational if
and only if they are probabilities, calibrated with physi-
cal probability and otherwise equivocate between the basic
possibilities.” [38, p. 16; my emphasis – FB] It is not clear
that an epistemic OM must embrace this norm as well, but
we will investigate a particular model below which clearly
does.
Thirdly, we (re-)acknowledge that these probability den-
sities are probabilities of (or conditional on) true states
λ obtaining, which we above identified as the assumption
that makes the whole approach decisively (metaphysically)
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realist. In fact, all the issues at hand, the status of the epis-
temic probabilities, the search for completeness, and the
status of the quantum state, all boil down to questions of
the precise kind of realism endorsed.
It has been criticized though, in particular by Norsen
[39], that in certain applications in the context of QM
(the violations of Bell-type inequalities) the discussion is
blurred by the use of the word ‘realism’, because “it is
almost never clear what exactly a given user means by the
term [...] and [...] none of [the] possibly-meant senses of
‘realism’ turn out to have the kind of relevance that the
users seem to think they have.” [39, pp. 311-312] Whether
Norsen’s assessment is correct is open to debate. But we
concede that there is a crucial terminological problem that
we should try to fix.
First of all we note that the ψ-epistemic OMs need
not be considered na¨ıvely realist in the sense appealed to
by Norsen [39, p. 316], namely in the sense that “when-
ever an experimental physicist performs a ‘measurement’
of some property of some physical system [...] the outcome
of that measurement is simply a passive revealing of some
pre-existing intrinsic property of the object.” (emphasis
omitted) This, Norsen thinks, is the physics-appropriate
generalization of “the view that all features of a perceptual
experience have their origin in some identical correspond-
ing feature of the perceived object.” (p. 315)
Classical physics is typically taken to entertain exactly
that sort of na¨ıve realism, as it seems to endorse that
measurements can at least in principle be as subtle and
non-invasive as desired (think again of Heisenberg’s “de-
struction of knowledge”, which he apparently considered
as a philosophical revelation). Similarly, the ensemble ap-
proaches discussed in section 2 may be classified as na¨ıvely
realist, but, again, ψ-epistemic OMs need not be viewed
as na¨ıvely realist in Norsen’s sense, since both prepara-
tion and measurement are infected with uncertainties, so
that pre-existing intrinsic properties of systems are not
just revealed passively10 – at least as long as the response
function is interpreted objectively.
More illuminatingly, it appears that the project of find-
ing ψ-epistemic models for QM must embrace a form of
scientific realism (i.e., that (i) mature and well confirmed
theories are capable of being true, and (ii) the concepts
of these very theories typically do refer to entities in the
external world, in all domains, including unobservable mi-
crostates [cf. 40, p. xvii]), since scientific methods are em-
ployed to seek out (refer to) the true states of investigated
systems. But since QM is interpreted operationally, this
realism can only (or at least: mostly) be endorsed here
w.r.t. classical physical concepts and theories.11 The fact
that in ψ-epistemic models, the aim is to reduce quantum
10By judging thusly, we are in fact disagreeing with Norsen, who
thinks that this na¨ıve realism is the idea of a non-contextual hidden
variable model. But the disagreement may be based on the under-
standing of ‘context’.
11Note that, if scientific realism was applied here to the concepts
of a hitherto undiscovered physical theory T , this would not be more
probabilities to classically interpretable ones, and quan-
tum states to definite states that provide a (more) com-
plete specification of reality should suffice as evidence for
this claim. Grossly speaking, we can hence classify EE
views as selectively scientific realist.
Peters [41, p. 377] describes selective scientific realism
as the view “that not all the propositions of an empirically
successful theory should be regarded as (approximately)
true but only those elements that are essential for its suc-
cess”, but he also notes that “[i]t is [...] not obvious how a
term like ‘essential’ is to be understood.” If we apply this
reading of ‘selective’ to the present case, what would be
such essential elements? We may take it that the possibil-
ity of a rather gapless (formal) picture of reality is consid-
ered somewhat essential to scientific theories by advocates
of an EE view, since the supplementation of additional
variables to the formal inventory (instead of an analysis
of the formal elements already present in QM) would oth-
erwise be a moot point. And indeed, Spekkens generally
characterizes OMs as “an attempt to offer an explanation
of the success of an operational theory by assuming that
there exist physical systems that are the subject of the
experiment.” [27, p. 2]
We can see that rather deep philosophical issues are
at stake here, and the OM approach provides not only
a technically useful basis for the general discussion of in-
terpretations of QM, but also for the assessment of these
very issues in the context of QM. But to assess whether
epistemic models formulated in the approach can ascer-
tain the completability of QM, the suitability of objective
(or empirically based subjective) Bayesianism for the in-
terpretation of probabilities in QM, and a selectively sci-
entific realist attitude for the general context, we must
ask: (i) Are there any models which fit the definitions
from section 3.1, and (ii) to what extent can these repro-
duce the empirical predictions of QM? Indeed, Harrigan
and Spekkens provide examples of models for each of their
categories, but we here turn to a model that Spekkens has
devised in 2007 instead, and which, we here take it, has so
far brought about the greatest apparent successes in pro-
viding evidence for an EE view. We will here grossly focus
on this model to evaluate (ii).
3.3. Spekkens’ Toy Model
What we here call a ‘toy model’ was originally devel-
oped by Spekkens [37] under the name “toy theory”, but
it can be fit into the OM approach, as shown in [12, p. 84]
and below. The toy model is only concerned with analoga
of qubit systems (i.e. systems with only two relevant states
in QM), but can be expanded to include systems of mul-
tiple, coupled qubits. The analogues of qubits in the toy
than a mere hope for scientific realism. Moreover, T would still have
to imply classical physical theories in suitable limits, and since T
is decidedly not QM, we can take it that an EE view seeks out a
T whose concepts would be more clearly compatible with those of
classical theories.
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model are called elementary systems (cf. [37, p. 3]). For
these elementary systems, Spekkens postulates four pos-
sible true states, simply denoted by {1, 2, 3, 4}. There is
a foundational principle at the heart of this model, called
the kowledge balance principle:
Knowledge Balance Principle (KB). If one has max-
imal knowledge, then for every system, at every time, the
amount of knowledge one possesses about the [true – FB]
state of the system at that time must equal the amount of
knowledge one lacks. [37, p. 3]
This, of course, immediately raises the question of how
to measure knowledge. To provide a measure, Spekkens
first defines what he calls canonical sets (cf. ibid.):
Definition (Canonical set). A canonical set is a set of
yes-no questions that is sufficient to fully specify the true
state, and that has a minimal number of elements.
To understand this notion, consider that if one only
knows that the state of the system under investigation is
in the set {1, 2, 3, 4} and one wants to find out in which of
the states it actually is, one could ask “Is it in state 1?”,
“Is it in state 2?”, and so forth. Or one could be smart
instead, and just ask, say, “Is the system’s state in the set
{1, 2}?”, and “Is the system’s state in the set {2, 3}?” Two
nos will give assurance that it is in state 4, two yeses that
it is in 2, and one yes and one no that it is either in 1 or
3, depending on the order. Now the amount of knowledge
one has is defined within the toy model as “the maximum
number of questions for which the answer is known, in a
variation over all canonical sets of questions.” (ibid.).
(KB) then dictates that one can always only know half
the answers in such a set, and this is somewhat reminis-
cent of an epistemic reading of the uncertainty relations.
Applied to physical systems such as spinful particles, we
can understand it such that, “if we know the x-coordinate
[of spin – FB] with certainty then we cannot know any-
thing about the y-coordinate.” [12, p. 73] Put frankly,
this means that the epistemic states (for simple systems)
within this model must be distributions which assign prob-
ability 1/2 to two states, and probability 0 to two others.
That is, we can always know that the state is in a subset
like {1, 2}, but nothing more.
To connect these principles to QM, consider (as does
Spekkens) the following six quantum states, which are the
only P/M-states of the model:
|0〉 , |1〉 ,
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
|+i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉), |−i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i |1〉),
with 〈0|1〉 = 0. Accordingly our epistemic states will be of
the form p(λ|x), λ ∈ {1, . . . 4}, x ∈ {0, 1,+,−,+i,−i}.
Since we are only concerned with a discrete set of pos-
sible true states, the probability distributions can be rep-
resented by n-tuples. This also means that condition (1)
which connects the QM probabilities with the probabilities
in the OM must be changed to a sum:
Tr(Eˆkρˆ) =
∑
λ∈Λ
pρˆ(λ)ξ
k
M (λ). (2)
Spekkens also introduces a convenient notation for the
epistemic states, which we will equally make use of in what
follows. We hence make the following identifications:
p0 = (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0)! 1 ∨ 2, p1 = (0, 0, 12 , 12 )! 3 ∨ 4,
p+ = (
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0)! 1 ∨ 3, p− = (0, 12 , 0, 12 )! 2 ∨ 4,
p+i = (0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0)! 2 ∨ 3, p−i = ( 12 , 0, 0, 12 )! 1 ∨ 4,
Curvy arrows are used to denote correspondence between
different notations, and the disjunctions should be read
‘merely symbolic’ at this point (we will spend a few thoughts
on connections to logic below). We have, e.g., p0(1) =
p0(2) =
1
2 and p0(3) = p0(4) = 0.
The response functions turn out deterministic here; for
instance,
Pr
|0〉
+/−(+) = | 〈+|0〉 |2 = 1/2
!
=
∑
λ∈Λ
p0(λ)ξ
+
+/−(λ),
where ‘+/−’ refers to the measurement associated with
outcomes + and −. But this means that ξ++/−(λ) has to
give 1 for the first of the λs, and cannot also give 1 for the
second one. Equally,∑
λ∈Λ
p1(λ)ξ
+
+/−(λ)
!
= | 〈+|1〉 |2 = 1/2,
∑
λ∈Λ
p+(λ)ξ
+
+/−(λ)
!
= | 〈+|+〉 |2 = 1,
∑
λ∈Λ
p−(λ)ξ++/−(λ)
!
= | 〈+|−〉 |2 = 0,
and so forth. All in all, we get ξ++/−(λ) = (1, 0, 1, 0), so
that the ξ for outcome + mirrors the p which is conditional
on +, but with 1s instead of 12 s. All the ξs can be worked
out to look this way.12
So ξ actually does not do any work here at all and
could be omitted altogether. Models of this kind have
been coined maximally ψ-epistemic (cf. [30, p. 2]; [42,
p. 4]), and the toy model is such a maximally epistemic
model.
With this simple setup, Spekkens is prima facie able
to reproduce a bunch of quantum phenomena. To this end
he assumes measurements to be “reproducible in the sense
that if repeated upon the same system, they yield the same
12Note that it is not a contradiction that the entries in ξ sum up
to 2 instead of 1, as ξ expressed in this way is variable in λ, i.e., in
the true state on which it is conditional, not in the outcome. Only
the sum over all outcome probabilities, given fixed parameters (λ,M)
must sum to one.
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outcome.” [37, p. 9; emphasis in original] In other words:
they are like the projective measurements of QM. But as
noted before, due to (KB) measurements cannot reveal the
true state λ, but can only change what one knows about
the system. To elaborate, first note that a state of total
ignorance, where one only knows λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, should
be described by an epistemic state p(λ) = 1/4,∀λ ∈ Λ, or
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 [37, p. 4].13
Upon measurement 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 will now be changed
into a state where one knows one of the (symbolic) disjunc-
tions 1∨2, 3∨4, 1∨3 . . . This is represented in the model as
the measurement ‘inducing a partition’, say {1, 2, 3, 4} M−→
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. This amounts to a probability update, rem-
iniscent, of course, of Bayesian condtionalization [cf. 38,
p. 75 ff.]. Let us say that some experimenter has no
prior knowledge about the true state of a system, and
hence no preference in belief as to which state an inves-
tigated system is in. Then her epistemic state should be
p = ( 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ). Upon measuring the value + (say), she
will instantaneously think that the system must be in one
of the states 1 and 3, but she can still give no preference
to any of the two. Thus her knowledge about the system
has to be represented as p+ = (
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0). This is the pic-
ture provided by the formal setup of the model of what
happens in a measurement, and it seems to explain the
presence of the projection postulate in orthodox QM.
It is important to note that (KB) is restricted to the
knowledge about a system at a given time. This is so be-
cause given that one knows 1 ∨ 2, a measurement which
partitions {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} will lead to definite knowledge
of the state of the system prior to the measurement; in
case one measures 1 ∨ 3 the state must have been 1, in
case of 2 ∨ 4 it must have been 2. The fact that one still
lacks complete knowledge about the system’s state after
the measurement is accounted for by an “unknown dis-
turbance” of the state, caused by the measurement [37,
p. 10].
The first achievement of this model now is that these
measurements can be demonstrated to exhibit non-
commutativity, just as quantum measurements do. Con-
sider two measurements A and B inducing partitions
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} respectively, and per-
formed on a system in state 1 ∨ 2. Performing the A-
measurement first will keep the system in 1 ∨ 2 and the
B-measurement will then yield 1∨3 and 2∨4 with equal fre-
quencies. Performing them the other way around, the B-
measurement will first update the epistemic state to either
1∨ 3 or 2∨ 4; but now the A-measurement will yield 1∨ 2
and 3∨ 4 with equal frequency. This should be compared,
say, to the non-commutativity of spin measurements along
orthogonal axes in a Stern-Gerlach experiment.
13Since nothing at all is known in states like 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4, this
can also be construed to mirror completely mixed states that can be
decomposed into multiple convex combinations [cf. 37, p. 5]. We here
also see that the model equivocates between basic possibilities, which
substantiates our previous claim that it is objectively Bayesian.
|0〉
|1〉
|+〉
|−〉
|−i〉 |+i〉
1 ∨ 2
3 ∨ 4
1 ∨ 3
2 ∨ 4
1 ∨ 4 2 ∨ 3
(a) (b)
Uˆ = 1√
2
(
1 i
i 1
)
P =
(
1 2 3 4
2 3 1 4
)
Figure 2: (a) is a regular Bloch sphere for the qubit states, (b)
is an analogous diagram for the epistemic states (cf. [37] for a
similar illustration). Two of these can be combined by opera-
tions +1, . . . , +4 to yield one of the respective other states, just
as two quantum states can be superposed to yield a third one.
In (a), transformations are represented by unitary operators
(which can be mapped onto rotations), in (b) permutations are
used instead.
Another achievement is the (partial) reproduction of
quantum superposition. This is accomplished by defin-
ing different rules for combining the epistemic states. For
instance, one could combine two states such as 1 ∨ 2 and
3∨4 by taking the true state of lowest index and combining
them into a new state, i.e. 1∨ 3. This may be symbolized
by writing (1 ∨ 2) +1 (3 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 3. Equally, we could
take the true states of highest index to obtain 2∨4, which
may be written as (1∨ 2) +2 (3∨ 4) = 2∨ 4. Taking one of
higher and one of lower index from both epistemic states
respectively will yield two further possibilities (+3 and +4;
cf. [37, p. 6]). With these four combination rules, the in-
terrelations of all six quantum sates considered above can
be mirrored, which is best illustrated in terms of Bloch
spheres (or Bloch sphere-like diagrams), as in figure 2.
There are, however, a few subtleties involved in this
analogy which lead into a (first) kind of trouble. Combin-
ing, say, (2∨ 3) +4 (1∨ 4) = 2∨ 4 in the toy model should,
according to the Bloch sphere-image, be analogous to su-
perposing |+i〉 and |−i〉 to get |−〉 in QM, i.e. developing
|−〉 = 〈+i|−〉 |+i〉 + 〈−i|−〉 |−i〉 = 1+i2 |+i〉 + 1−i2 |−i〉.
A complication is now raised, however, by the fact that
combination rules +3 and +4 have a particular ordering
sensitivity, as e.g. (1 ∨ 4) +4 (2 ∨ 3) = 1 ∨ 3 6= (2 ∨ 3) +4
(1 ∨ 4). One can model this situation by a superposition
1√
2
(|+i〉 − i |−i〉) with relative phase, which is equal to
e−i
pi
4 |−〉, because
e−i
pi
4 = cos
(
−pi
4
)
+ i sin
(
−pi
4
)
=
= cos
(pi
4
)
− i sin
(pi
4
)
=
1√
2
(1− i),
so that
e−i
pi
4 |−〉 = 1√
2
(1− i) |−〉 = 1√
2
(|+i〉 − i |−i〉).
I.e., we obtain |−〉 up to a(n empirically meaningless global
overall) phase, but the superposition rule thus essentially
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includes a relative phase of 3pi2 (since e
i 3pi2 = −i) between
the two states superposed. In fact, the four combination
rules above can all be understood in terms of quantum
superpositions with a relative phase, and Spekkens [37,
p. 7] makes the following identifications:
+1! +ei·0, +2! +eipi,
+3! +ei
pi
2 , +4! +ei
3pi
2 .
These identifications reveal the subtleties mentioned above
and show that the analogy between combinations of epis-
temic states and quantum superpositions is not—and can-
not be made—perfect. In the given choice one obtains
(1 ∨ 3) +3 (2 ∨ 4) = 2 ∨ 3 and (1 ∨ 3) +4 (2 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 4,
but 1√
2
(|+〉+eipi2 |−〉) = eipi4 |−i〉 and 1√
2
(|+〉+ei 3pi2 |−〉) =
e−i
pi
4 |+i〉, which, given the identifications between combi-
nation rules and epistemic- and quantum states, should be
exactly the other way around. Exchanging identifications
in the latter case will always only shift the problem [cf. 37,
p. 7]. According to Spekkens (ibid.), “[t]his curious failure
of the analogy shows that an elementary system in the toy
theory is not simply a constrained version of a qubit.”
So the toy model fails to correctly reproduce the QM
toolkit from epistemic restrictions in this instance, and is
bound to do so. But this need not be a strong objection to
the general enterprise yet, because (a) we are here dealing
with a limited toy model only, and (b) it should not be
required that any successful alternative to QM must mir-
ror the quantum formalism isomorphically; a successful re-
placement of, or alternative to QM should only be required
to preserve QM’s successful predictions. If we construe the
model, however, as a first approach to reducing the exact
rules of QM to incomplete knowledge (thereby serving as
evidence for an EE view), then it must still appear as a
drawback that the model fails to do so.
Be that as it may, further interesting phenomena can
(apparently) be reproduced within the toy model in virtue
of state transformations being represented in the model as
permutations of true states in the epistemic state, or equiv-
alently, as resamplings of the epistemic state (cf. figure 2).
In the Bayesian paradigm, this amounts to a change in an
observer’s knowledge, the point being that the true state
of a system does not have to change, even if the epistemic
state of an observer does. One can of course find out some
new piece of information, regardless of whether the sys-
tem this information is about remains entirely unchanged.
Intuitively we can access the formal analogy to unitary
transformations in the Bloch representation, as the latter
correspond to rotations (up to an overall phase) of point-
ers inside the sphere, and permutations will also appear
as rotations by angles of npi2 (n ∈ Z) in the toy sphere (cf.
figure 2 (b)).
But what is striking about permutations as state trans-
formations is that they seem to make the reproduction
of quantum interference examples possible. To elaborate,
θ = pi
d1
d2
S
BS1 BS2
Figure 3: Mach-Zehnder interferometer with an optional phase.
consider the following setup14 based on a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer (figure 3), where one photon at a time en-
ters the setup, emitted from a source (S) towards a 50/50
beam splitter (BS1), so that there will be a 50/50 chance
for each photon of passing through BS1 or being reflected
at a right angle.
Neglecting polarization etc., we can model this as a
simple spatial qubit of a ‘moving up state’ |↗〉 .= (10) and
a ‘moving down state’ |↘〉 .= (01) (‘ .=’ implies a choice of
representation). Now take a photon prepared as |↗〉 by S.
BS1 will change the state into a superposition of moving
up and moving down, represented by
UˆH |↗〉 = 1√
2
(|↗〉+ |↘〉) =: |ψ〉 , (3)
UˆH
.
= 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
the Hadamard gate.
Imagine now that behind each beam of photons ema-
nating from BS1 there are mirrors (the thick black lines
in figure 3), aligned such that both trajectories are de-
flected towards each other again. We can represent the
transformation effected by the mirrors by the σˆx Pauli-
matrix, which will only exchange the flying up- and down-
components of |ψ〉 and hence essentially leave it untouched,
as (
0 1
1 0
)
1√
2
(
1
1
)
=
1√
2
(
1
1
)
.
We can also insert a phase shifter in the lower branch, say,
but after the mirrors, so that it will only affect the flying-
up part of the spatial superposition state. If we choose
θ = pi as our phase, we will obtain a transformation which
can be represented by the matrix
Φˆ(θ)
.
=
(
eiθ 0
0 1
)
θ=pi
=
(−1 0
0 1
)
, (4)
(which is just (−1) · σˆz) so that we get
Φˆ(pi) |ψ〉 .=
(−1 0
0 1
)( 1√
2
1√
2
)
=
(
− 1√
2
1√
2
)
.
=
1√
2
(|↘〉 − |↗〉) =: |ψ′〉 . (5)
But in case we insert a second beam splitter (BS2 in the
14Note that no analogous discussion of such an example is provided
in [37].
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figure) at the point where the two trajectories cross, |ψ′〉
will change as
UˆH |ψ′〉 .= 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)(− 1√
2
1√
2
)
=
(
0
−1
)
.
= − |↘〉 . (6)
So our simple qubit model predicts that we will always
find a down moving photon in this setup, which has only
picked up an unobservable phase of pi (eipi = −1).
Computing the probabilities for detecting an up- or
downward traveling photon at the end of this setup gives,
of course, | − 〈↗|↘〉 |2 = 0 and | − 〈↘|↘〉 |2 = 1. The
relative phase between two kets is entirely responsible for
the precise resulting behavior at BS2;
15 without the phase
we would instead have
UˆH |ψ〉 .= 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)( 1√
2
1√
2
)
=
(
1
0
)
.
= |↗〉 , (7)
i.e. only photons moving up at the end of the setup.
To check the predictions of this model one can use de-
tectors (d1 and d2 in figure 3) which give off a perceivable
signal (a click if you will) upon incidence of a photon.
With the phase shifter in place this (ideally) means only
detections in d2, and without the phase shifter (ideally)
only in d1, and experiments of this kind have of course
been successfully performed [43].16
Since the setup contains only one photon at a time, it
seems surprising that it should matter to a photon travel-
ing along the upper path whether there is a phase shifter
in the lower one. But still, an analogous example can be
constructed in the toy model by appeal to permutations
instead of unitary matrices. The simplest type of permu-
tation is a swap of two elements in an ordered sequence,
and we will describe all permutations occurring in the ex-
ample in terms of such swaps here. Thus, let (jk) repre-
sent the swap of elements j and k in some ordered n-tuple
(n ≥ j, n ≥ k). Then in the toy model we start out with
1 ∨ 2! p↗ as the epistemic state corresponding to the
preparation of |↗〉 (= |0〉). The first beam splitter is rep-
resented by a permutation (23), which results in 1∨ 3 (i.e.
3 will now be assigned the probability previously assigned
to 2, which is 12 ). The mirrors can be represented by (13),
yielding 3 ∨ 1 = 1 ∨ 3, so that not much happens here,
just as in the QM treatment. In case the phase shifter is
in, this can be modeled as a permutation corresponding to
15Note that we have assumed both arms of the interferometer to
be of equal length, so that none of the two states can pick up a phase
due to spatial delay.
16In fact, varying the phase somewhat more than just θ ∈ {0, pi},
one can appeal to probabilities of detection in either d1 or d2, where
Pr
ψθ
x (d1) = | 〈↗|ψθ〉 |2 = cos2( θ2 ) for |ψθ〉 := 12
(
(1 − eiθ) |↘〉 +
(1 + eiθ) |↗〉
)
, as results from the setup with a general phase shift.
One can equally use a difference in path length, as mentioned in
footnote 15, and this is what was done in [43], to confirm that the
number of counts would conform to the predicted cos2-regularity.
two successive swaps (12)(34) which then yield 2∨ 4. And
the second beam splitter will again correspond to (23), so
that the final state is 3 ∨ 4. But this distribution is the
one corresponding to the quantum sate |1〉 = |↘〉 so that
the quantum predictions are indeed preserved. Equally,
if the phase shifter is not inserted, this means that the
permutation (12)(34) is left out, whence 1 ∨ 3 will just be
transformed into 1∨2 at the second beam splitter, and we
obtain the state that we started off with, again just as in
QM.17
Thus the toy model can indeed reproduce interference
examples with the aid of resamplings of probability distri-
butions. And resamplings can result in the toy-analogue of
superpositions just as unitary transformations can result
in quantum superpositions. We have here considered only
a limited example with a certain fixed phase, but a mathe-
matical generalization of Spekkens’ work exists [44] which
can handle arbitrary phase arguments in terms of proba-
bility vectors and transformation matrices. This achieve-
ment has lead several authors to conclude that “a whole
host of Mach-Zehnder interferometry experiments can be
qualitatively reproduced by the theory[...].” [12, p. 79]18
“But hold on!”, you may interject, “How can a lack of
knowledge account for the fact that what I do in the lower
arm of the interferometer will influence all photons in the
setup, even if they take the upper route?” And as well
you should. We have here rather ‘blindly’ applied the for-
mal tools of the toy model, which then appeared to nicely
mirror some features of QM. But that permutations can
be made to look like rotations on the Bloch sphere, and
that these rotations in turn are homomorphic to unitary
operations is a long shot from accepting that resamplings
of a probability distribution (construed as a formal repre-
sentation of a change in knowledge) can account for what
goes on in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. How is it that
our knowledge should be affected by the putting in of the
phase shifter?
For all we know, many of the true states of systems in
the setup—those representing something moving through
the upper route—should not be affected at all, whence,
a fortiori, neither should our knowledge of them. Build-
ing the example bottom-up, we would certainly not have
guessed that putting in a phase shifter must result in in-
terference, in case only one photon enters the setup. It is
only our background knowledge of QM and the confirming
experiments that allows us to concoct the toy model in the
appropriate way, and it leaves us without any explanation
as to why our knowledge should change in this way. To be
fair, we should here take into account that Spekkens aims
to “identify phenomena that are characteristic of states of
17All of these swaps can be implemented in the form of transforma-
tion matrices, as indicted in footnote 6. If one uses columns instead
of rows to represent the epistemic states, (23) on 1∨ 2, say, takes on
the simple form
(
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
)(
1/2
1/2
0
0
)
=
(
1/2
0
1/2
0
)
.
18Cf. also [45, p. 3] or [46, p. 388].
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incomplete knowledge regardless of what this knowledge
is about.” [37, p. 2] A possible move at this point is thus
to counter that we are informed by our experience with
Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and that we should, in ac-
cord with the Calibration norm, adapt our epistemic states
to the known frequencies in experiments with or without
phase shifter.
Still, there is some tension with the general philosoph-
ical stance of an EE view, as we have identified it in previ-
ous sections. A key motivation for an EE view is a certain
preservation of common sense to secure a thorough basis
for metaphysical realism. In particular, the introduction
of true states λ was identified to ensure microdefiniteness,
and as such it raises hopes for finding a more complete
physical theory that makes it possible (in principle) to give
an account of how the world is (beyond the QM descrip-
tion). Thus if the project is to serve its principal goal, it
should at least allow for an ontology of the true states that
provides an explanation of the situation in question.
Hence: What do 1, 2, 3, 4 represent, and how are they
affected by the setup in such a way that the kind of prob-
ability update exemplified above is indicated? In fact,
Spekkens and others seem to feel this need for explanation
as well whence there is a kind of (ex post) explanation in
the literature (cf. [47]; [45]; [12]). But we will only be able
to suitably assess its plausibility after a discussion of two
no-go theorems below.
We should now also look at combined states of two
(or more) simple systems in the model. Loosely follow-
ing [37, p. 11 ff.], we can represent the simultaneous oc-
curence of two true states i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} on two dis-
tinct systems a, b respectively by a (symbolic) conjunc-
tion i(a) ∧ j(b). Of course having such an epistemic state
is prohibited by (KB) since it would correspond to com-
plete knowledge of the true states of both systems. But
combinations of epistemic states, i.e. states of the form
[j(a) ∨ k(a)] ∧ [`(b) ∨ m(b)], with j, k, `,m ∈ Λ, and j 6=
k, ` 6= m, are possible. These mimic simple product states
of QM, such as |ψ(a)〉 |φ(b)〉.
A second possibility are states of the form [j(a)∧k(b)]∨
[`(a)∧m(b)]∨ [n(a)∧ o(b)]∨ [p(a)∧ q(b)] with j 6= ` 6= n 6=
p, k 6= m 6= o 6= q. I.e.: it could be known, say, that both
systems are in the same state, but not in which state. Or
it could be known that both are in different states, related
by a certain specified permutation (transformation), but
not which is in which. States of this form are supposed to
mimic entangled states, and prima facie they do capture
the essence of such states quite well.
To see this, take two systems which have been prepared
in an entangled state, say |pi〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉). Then
this state implies that there is a probability of 1/2 for each
(sub)system to exhibit either of the two measurable val-
ues (0,1), but both systems are bound to exhibit the same
value if the same observable is measured on them. Now
consider a situation in which the two systems are sepa-
rated spatially and two agents, A and B or ‘Alice’ and
‘Bob’, as they are usually called, perform measurements
on them. Then at the very moment Alice measures ‘1’,
she will know that Bob will measure ‘1’ as well, in case he
measures the same observable. Phrased in terms of knowl-
edge this is not so much of a surprise, but if we would en-
dorse the orthodox interpretation instead, with its sudden
change in the system’s actual state due to the measure-
ment, then Alice would be capable of ‘steering’19 Bob’s
system into some definite state, by choosing a certain kind
of measurement to perform on her system—and suppos-
edly instantaneously so at arbitrarily large distances.
From the point of view of the toy model this surprising
consequence dissolves. Alice’s state prior to measurement
should be represented as [1(a)∧1(b)]∨ [2(a)∧2(b)]∨ [3(a)∧
3(b)]∨ [4(a)∧ 4(b)], since she knows that both systems are
in the same state, even though she cannot know in which
one. Accordingly, the measurement must result in some-
thing like [1(a) ∨ 2(a)] ∧ [1(b) ∨ 2(b)], say. Treating the
connectives in these symbolic formulae as actual conjunc-
tions and disjunctions as in propositional logic for the mo-
ment, the latter statement straightforwardly follows from
[1(a) ∧ 1(b)] ∨ [2(a) ∧ 2(b)] by case distinction and adding
disjuncts. But the other, more important direction is not
straightforwardly valid, since [1(a) ∨ 2(a)] ∧ [1(b) ∨ 2(b)]
is also true if [1(a) ∧ 2(b)] holds, and taking into account
that states pertaining to the same system mutually exclude
each other,20 [1(a)∧ 1(b)]∨ [2(a)∧ 2(b)] would actually be
false. With the epistemic state as given above however
(the fourfold disjunction) and mutual state exclusion on
the same system, Alice can draw the appropriate conclu-
sion.
Let us say that Alice chooses to measure {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}
on her system and finds 1∨3. Then she will come to know
that both systems must be in either of those two true states
(1 or 3). If she decides to measure {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} instead
and finds 1 ∨ 2, then she comes to know that both sys-
tems must be in one of these states. So in fact performing
both measurements in a row and obtaining these respec-
tive results Alice can come to the conclusion that both
her and Bob’s system must have been in state 1 all along.
So she instantaneously obtains information about the dis-
tant system. But since the act of measurement effects
and unknown disturbance, the states of both systems may
now (after both measurements) be different; the state of
her system (a) could have changed to 2, in virtue of the
disturbance effected by the second measurement. And as-
suming Bob performs the same protocol, he need not even
obtain outcome 1∨2 in the second measurement, since his
system’s state could have been changed to 3 in the first
measurement and then 3 ∨ 4 would result in the second
case. All that Alice can come to know is hence that dur-
ing the first measurement both systems were in state 1;
19This is the much-used term introduced by Schro¨dinger [48,
p. 556].
20It would hence be more appropriate to use exclusive disjunction
∨˙ instead of ∨.
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and hence this setup cannot be used as a means of com-
munication. This is of course reminiscent of the so called
no-signaling theorems in QM [cf. e.g. 49, pp. 393-394].
The truly crucial thing to realize, however, is that even
if there is no real change in the true state of b due to Al-
ice’s measurement, it may still appear this way in case one
confuses the epistemic state with the true state of the sys-
tem. Since the model is supposed to provide evidence for
an EE view of quantum states, the suggestion here seems
to be that this sort of confusion is exactly what happens
in orthodox QM. The example is indeed suggestive; prima
facie the ψ-epistemicist has a major advantage here. But
the example is also selective, and we all know (as do, of
course, Spekkens and collaborators [cf. 37, 21, 22]) that
the existence of Bell-type inequalities raises doubts about
this kind of an interpretation of entanglement. This is an
issue we will reassess in the discussion.
For completeness’ sake, it should not go unmentioned
that Bartlett et al. [22] have worked out a model similar
in spirit to Spekkens’ original toy model, which reproduces
a bunch of phenomena in continuous-range systems.21 A
thorough discussion of this model exceeds the scope of this
paper, whence we only give a brief review. In short, the
authors show that putting an epistemic restriction (similar
to (KB)) on Liouville mechanics, the statistical version
of classical Hamiltonian mechanics, one obtains a theory
which is “operationally equivalent” (p. 2) with a subtheory
of QM, which they spell out to mean that
there is a one-to-one mapping between the prepa-
rations, measurements, and transformations that
are allowed in the first theory and those that
are allowed in the second and [that] the statis-
tics predicted for every possible experiment in
the first theory are precisely the same as those
predicted for the corresponding experiment in
the second theory. (p. 15)
Because the model is a restricted version of classical
statistical mechanics, the true states of systems in ques-
tion are points z = (q1, . . . , q3n, p1, . . . , p3n) in phase space
(for n mass points with 3 position and 3 momentum coor-
dinates qi, pj ; we set 6n ≡ N).
The epistemic restriction is twofold. First of all, Bartlett
et al. define the set
L+(Γ) :=
{
µ|µ : Γ→ R, µ ≥ 0,
∫
Γ
µ(z) dNz = 1
}
of (Liouville) probability densities on phase space Γ. Then
for any µ to be considered a valid distribution for their
model, it is required that (i) the covariance matrix γ(µ)
21It is not clear that the model fits into the OM approach or
whether it can be made to do so. This does not pose a problem
for us though, since we are concerned more generally with EE views
of quantum states.
satisfies the ‘classical uncertainty principle’ γ(µ)+inΣ ≥ 0,
where n is a free parameter and
Σ :=

0 −1 0 0 . . .
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
,
and that (ii) µ has maximum entropy
S(µ) = −
∫
Γ
µ(z) ln(µ(z)) dNz
over Γ among all phase space distributions with the same
covariance matrix [22, p. 5]. The covariance matrix of
a distribution that depends on multiple coordinates zi, zj
(in phase space, in this case) describes, in components γij ,
(twice) the covariance
〈(
zi − 〈zi〉
)(
zj − 〈zj〉
)〉
µ
, i.e. the
correlation of departures from the mean values 〈zi〉µ , 〈zj〉µ
according to µ [cf. 50, p. 361]. The bite of (i) is that it
parallels an actual formulation of the uncertainty relations,
and thus ensures that in the restricted Liouville mechan-
ics, relations such as ∆px∆x ≥ n/2 hold (for adjustable n).
(ii) on the other hand “ensures that an agent should have
the maximum uncertainty about the physical state of the
system consistent with knowing the means and the covari-
ance matrix.” [22, p. 5] The valid distributions satisfying
(i) and (ii) are all of Gaussian form.
The theory which results is thus operationally equiv-
alent (in their sense) to what they call “Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics” (p. 2), the part of QM “including only
those preparations, measurements, and transformations
that have Gaussian Wigner representations [...].” (ibid.)
However, we shall argue below that even in this more elab-
orate model, some quantum phenomena—and arguably
the most important ones—cannot be reproduced.
4. The Impact of No-Go Results
The EE view in the form of ψ-epistemic models has
been confronted with a bunch of no-go results, the most
influential one being that of Matthew Pusey, Jonathan
Barrett, and Terry Rudolph (PBR), published in Nature
in 2012. In a preprint-version of their paper, the authors
also proposed an error-tolerant version of the experimental
conditions described in the proof, allowing for an actual
test of the diverging predictions, which has indeed been
successfully implemented shortly after [51]. The theorem
is supposed to demonstrate that a ψ-epistemic model for
QM is not feasible, but its proof is of course not free of as-
sumptions, and we need to dedicate some careful attention
to these. The theorem is first demonstrated for quantum
states with overlap 〈φ|ψ〉 = 1√
2
and then generalized to
states with arbitrary overlaps. We shall restrict ourselves
to a discussion of the former case and only briefly sketch
how the generalization is established.
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We shall see, however, that this particular theorem may
not be as devastating to an EE view as its popularity sug-
gests. Its main impact rather is that it has spawned off
a new level of the debate and inspired a host of further
no-go results. We will subsequently review and analyze
a theorem by L. Hardy [45], which may, effectively, have
deeper implications for current successes of facilitating an
EE view than does the PBR theorem.
4.1. The PBR Theorem
To show the incompatibility of QM with ψ-epistemic
models, PBR consider two qubit systems which are sup-
posed to be prepared entirely independently of one an-
other, each in one of the two quantum states |0〉 and |+〉.
Note that these states are non-orthogonal, whence, in line
with the discussion above, they are plausible candidates
for P-states with overlapping associated probability distri-
butions (signifying ψ-epistemicity).
The first thing to realize22 is that the assumption of
independence translates into two different formal require-
ments in the two different formalisms (QM proper and the
OM approach), whose intertranslation requires a bridging
assumption. In QM, independence can be represented by
the use of product states; thus, if |Ψ〉 denotes the total P-
state of the two systems, we can translate the assumption
of preparation independence into
|Ψ〉 ∈ {|0〉 |0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ1〉
, |0〉 |+〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ2〉
, |+〉 |0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ3〉
, |+〉 |+〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ4〉
} =: P (Prod. 1)
(with i, j ∈ {0,+}, P for ‘preparation’). Now in the OM-
approach two true states λ1 and λ2 need to be specified,
since two systems are concerned. The next non-trivial as-
sumption (the bridging principle) is that the state space
is separable in an appropriate manner, i.e.:
ΛΨ = Λ1 × Λ2, (Sep.)
with Λ1 and Λ2 the state spaces of the two systems respec-
tively [cf. 52, 12]. This separability assumption amounts to
assuming that, “when modeling independent local prepa-
rations, there are no additional properties of the joint sys-
tem that are not derived from the properties of the indi-
vidual systems.” [12, p. 100] It is hence basically the onto-
logical assumption which justifies the next step. Namely,
given (Sep.), the independence-assumption can be trans-
lated into a classical probabilistic language, suitable for
the OM approach, as
pj(λ1, λ2) = pk(λ1)p`(λ2), j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k, ` ∈ {0,+}
(Prod. 2)
[cf. 32, p. 477], where pj(λ1, λ2) := p(λ1, λ2|Ψj) and
pk(λ) := p(λ|ψk) (j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k ∈ {0,+}). The two
22Note, however, that we here provide an analysis that dissents
from the original presentation in [32], and in part draws on other
analyses (where referenced).
Not +,+
0 or +
Not 0,0
Not 0,+
Not +,0
Preparation Measurement
0 or +
Figure 4: Each system is prepared in one of two quantum states;
the entangled measurement performed on both systems simul-
taneously then finds out which of the four possible product
states was not prepared. (Cf. [32] for a similar illustration).
conditions (Prod. 1) and (Prod. 2) are neither logically
equivalent, nor does (Prod. 1) straightforwardly imply
(Prod. 2). But arguably (Prod. 1) conceptually implies
(Sep.), and (Sep.) conceptually implies (Prod. 2): If we
can prepare two systems in (sufficient) isolation from one
another, we use a tensor product in QM to represent the
(P-)state of a composite system. But if we use such a prod-
uct state, we assume both component systems to be (suf-
ficiently) independent of one another. And given that we
hence assume their respective (true) states to also be inde-
pendent of one another, i.e., given (Sep.) we would model
this very situation by a mere product-distribution in a ‘tra-
ditional’ probabilistic setting.23 Hence it fully suffices to
claim that (Prod. 1)→(Sep.), and that (Sep.)→(Prod. 2)
to get the central premise:
(Prod. 1)→ (Prod. 2) (P.-Indep.)
Suppose now [32] that there is a ∆ such that λ1, λ2 ∈
∆, i.e. there are true states on both of the two systems
which lie in the overlap-region for probability distribu-
tions possibly associated with distinct quantum states |0〉
and |+〉. Basically: assume ψ-epistemicity to hold, as
defined in section 3.1, but for true states of two differ-
ent systems. Also, fix some lower limit q > 0 such that
pk(λ1) ≥ q, p`(λ2) ≥ q for k, ` ∈ {0,+} and λ1, λ2 ∈ ∆.
Then by (P.-Indep.), we get that
pΨ(λ1, λ2) ≥ q2, ∀Ψ ∈ P ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ ∆ (∆)
We call this intermediate result ‘(∆)’ because the ex-
istence of some ∆ (i.e. the positivity of the product dis-
tribution pΨ on some set of non-zero measure) regardless
of the specific preparation on each system, is crucial. It is
also crucial to realize that the preparation procedures on
both systems do the same thing, i.e., prepare either |+〉
or |0〉, whence the (total) range of true states λ possibly
resulting from the preparations is identical for the two sys-
tems. This (in concert with (P.-Indep.)) justifies why it
even makes sense to consider this setup for two systems
23This of course means that pj(λ1|λ2, ψ(2)k ) = pj(λ1), j, k ∈
{0,+}, with ψ(2)k the P-state for the second system, and analogously
for pk(λ2).
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as a means to check for the possibility of a ψ-epistemic
model, where the assumption of an overlap was previously
formulated w.r.t. to the states of one and the same system.
Now the measurement executed on the two systems is
performed by bringing them together in one measurement-
device and measuring them jointly (cf. figure 4). A mea-
surement of this kind is called global, since all the sys-
tems in some total state |Φ〉 are measured together, and
only information about their total state |Φ〉 is acquired.
Among such global measurements, one can further dis-
tinguish measurements which have only product states as
possible outcomes from such which have at least one en-
tangled state among their outcomes. That is to say, in the
latter case, the operators used to describe the measure-
ment have entangled eigenvectors. These are then (un-
surprisingly) called entangled measurements [cf. e.g. 53,
pp. 219-220].
The measurement considered by PBR is exactly such
an entangled (global) measurement. Furthermore, it is
projective, resulting in an M-state out of the following set:
R :=
{
|φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉),
|φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |−〉+ |1〉 |+〉),
|φ3〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |1〉+ |−〉 |0〉),
|φ4〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |−〉+ |−〉 |+〉)
}
[cf. 32, p. 476].24 What we now see is that for each of the
|φj〉 ∈ R there is a |Ψk〉 ∈ P which is orthogonal to it
(whence the global property to be measured is which of
the states was not prepared; cf. figure 4). For instance,
〈φ1|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(〈0|⊗〈1|+ 〈1|⊗〈0|) |0〉⊗|0〉 =
=
1√
2
(〈0|0〉 〈1|0〉+ 〈1|0〉 〈0|0〉) =
=
1√
2
(1 · 0 + 0 · 1) = 0, (8)
and (because of the way we have indexed the states) in
general 〈φj |Ψj〉 = 0.
But recall that the connection between the Born prob-
abilities and the probability distributions in the OM was
established by an integral over the epistemic state and the
response function (formula (1)). This integral must now
take the form
Pr
|Ψj〉
R (k) =
∫
dλ1
∫
dλ2 pj(λ1, λ2)ξ
φk
R (λ1, λ2)
[cf. 32, p. 477], with ξφkR (λ1, λ2) the response function for
24We call this set ‘R’ for ‘result’, and for notational simplicity we
will later also use this letter to refer to the measurement (POVM)
associated with the outcome states in R.
outcome k.
Moreover, it is plausible to require that
4∑
k=1
ξφkR (λ1, λ2) = 1, ∀(λ1, λ2) ∈ ΛΨ, (Outc.)
i.e. that there will always be some outcome for all the
states that may result from the preparation [cf. e.g. 33,
p. 1]. Of course this is quite an idealization, and we may
assume that (Outc.) is only required to hold up to ex-
pected experimental noise and error.
Since pj(λ1, λ2) is at least q
2 on a set ∆ of non-zero
measure in virtue of (∆), it must hold that
∃k∀j : Pr|Ψj〉R (k) =
∫
dλ1
∫
dλ2 pj(λ1, λ2)ξ
φk
R (λ1, λ2) > 0
!
= |〈φk|Ψj〉|2 = 0 for j = k  (PBR)
(with j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4}). This is the PBR contradiction.
(Prod. 1), (P.-Indep.), and (Outc.) taken together with
the definition of ψ-epistemicity and the general assump-
tions of the OM framework (short: {OM}), lead to a con-
tradiction; hence PBR conclude:
{OM}, (Prod. 1), (P.-Indep.), (Outc.) ` ¬(ψ-epistemicity)
(9)
Expressed differently, this means that any ψ-epistemic OM
cannot maintain (Prod. 1), (P.-Indep.), and (Outc.) to-
gether, all of which are prima facie reasonable assump-
tions. So possibly there are no suitable ψ-epistemic OMs.
We have restricted our attention to the two-system
case, but the result of PBR is generalized [32, p. 476 ff.]
using tensor-product states |Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |ψn〉 of ar-
bitrary finite cardinality n, where each system is prepared
in either |0〉 or |+〉 (ψj ∈ {0,+}, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n). This allows
for states with an overlap different from that between |0〉
and |+〉 to be used in the preparation.
But how deep is the impact of PBR’s result really?
Should it be taken to rule out ψ-epistemic OMs tout court?
To answer this question, we should look at each of the
premises of the proof separately.
A lot of criticism towards the premises of the PBR the-
orem can be found especially in an article by Schlosshauer
and Fine [54]. Notably, they first of all refrain from even
using the terminology of ‘ψ-epistemic’ and ‘ψ-onitc’ mod-
els, and refer to these classes of models as ‘mixed’ and ‘seg-
regated’ instead (to them this terminology is “less charged”
[54, p. 4]). Thus, the general aptness of the very defi-
nition of a ψ-epistemic model used in the OM approach
may of course be put into question (and hence the premise
{OM}). A whole other set of criteria for understanding the
wave function as a representation of knowledge (in the EE
sense) may of course be available. Schlossauer and Fine
then also show a way of transforming mixed models into
segregated ones and vice versa, thus lessening the appeal
of the definitions from section 3.1 as indeed reflecting a
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distinction between something that represents knowledge
and something that represents something real.25
Beyond that, Schlosshauer and Fine suggest to aug-
ment the spectrum of outcome values associated with the
measurement with so called ‘no-shows’, i.e. to allow for
measurements with no discernible outcome at all, and hence
to modify the connection between the Born probabilities
and the probability distributions in the OM-framework ac-
cordingly. One crucial step of PBR’s theorem is to require
(Outc.) and (Outc.) is, as we noted, somewhat ideal-
ized. Modifying this requirement in such a way that, given
that the true state is in the overlap region, there will be
a probability of obtaining no outcome at all, determined
by the true state itself, obviously blocks the inference to
¬(ψ-epistemicity). Schlosshauer and Fine refer to this as
a “built-in inefficiency” [54, p. 2], since the assumption is
that there is something about the measured system itself
which lets the probability of a (discernible) outcome drop
in the appropriate region.
A bit more precisely, the general recipe goes like this:
Determine some probability ξ∅R(λ1, λ2) of getting a null-
outcome ∅ (i.e. something that cannot be recognized prop-
erly as an outcome on the measuring device), sufficiently
high for the λ ∈ ∆, so that the QM statistics is repro-
duced, but now from probabilities conditional on the fact
that a discernible outcome was measured at all (i.e. by
postselecting the statistics for runs in which there was
a determinate outcome). Then for the set of outcomes
{φ1, . . . φ4, ∅}, the resulting version of (Outc.) is not vi-
olated and no contradiction arises. Under these assump-
tions, all that the PBR-result shows is “how inefficiencies
arise as a fundamental property of certain hidden-variables
models [...].” [54, p. 2]
This is a kind of ‘prism model’, which the reader may
be familiar with from the context of Bell inequalities. How-
ever, there is a certain ad hoc-ness to assuming that the
true states from the overlap mysteriously sabotage the
measurement procedure just to recover the quantum statis-
tics. Thus we may be inclined to put more doubt on the
justifyability of Schlosshauer and Fine’s no-show assess-
ment than on PBR’s own one.
The various assumptions underlying (P.-Indep.) are
also under scrutiny in Schlosshauer and Fine’s article. They
think that “[c]orrelations [...] cannot be ruled out, even if
the preparations appear to be independent, because pro-
cedures for preparing the individual subsystems may oc-
cur together closely in spacetime or share common sources
of energy, as well as a common past.” [54, p. 3] In our
reconstruction we may take this criticism to aim at the
validity of the implication (Prod. 1)→(Sep.), and so in-
directly at the validity of (P.-Indep.). But (Sep.) can be
weakened to the condition (call it ‘(Sep.∗)’) that, if there
is a λ in the support of each of the epistemic states as-
sociated with the multiple systems and respective quan-
25These charges of transformability between the two types of mod-
els are, however, challenged by Leifer [12, p. 113-114].
tum states, then there is also some λc in the support of
the common distribution pΨ associated with the product
state |Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |ψn〉 (ibid.). The exact nature
(and structure) of λc can then be left completely unspeci-
fied. From this one neither gets the condition (P.-Indep.),
because (Sep.∗) does not imply (Prod. 2), but rather that
pΨ(λc) > 0 (call this ‘(Pos.)’). Nor does one get the (exact)
q2-result (∆), which follows from (Prod. 2), not (Pos.).
But since the weaker (Pos.) is obviously sufficient to de-
rive a contradiction (i.e. (Outc.) would still have to be vio-
lated) it appears that PBR’s conclusion ¬(ψ-epistemicity)
is not really warranted, and that the theorem need not
be considered as applying to ψ-epistemic models after all.
But this move of Schlosshauer and Fine is only possible
on the pains of replacing (Sep.) by (Sep.∗) and hence by
denying (P.-Indep.), or in other words: by assuming that
the systems in question cannot be prepared (sufficiently)
independently of one another.
Additionally, Schlosshauer and Fine criticize that PBR
implicitly assume that the response functions ξ
φj
R (λ1, λ2)
do not depend on Ψ, and they propose [54, p. 2 ff.] that
models which avoid the problem raised by PBR can be con-
structed, in case this assumption is dropped. They call the
class of models presupposed by PBR state-independent.
Leifer [12, p. 111], in contrast, thinks that “this criticism
is simply a misunderstanding of what is meant by the term
‘ontic state’ in the ontological models framework”, and
goes on to demonstrate an example of how models can
trivially reproduce the Born probabilities in case state de-
pendence is allowed (that is, in case ξ is also conditional
on the prepared quantum state Ψ). In a similar vein, Bal-
lentine refers to such models as “functionally ψ-ontic”, be-
cause
[t]he most important structure of the model
is the separation of preparation from measure-
ment, with information passing only via the
ontic state variables. If the state ψ has a di-
rect effect on the measurement outcome, then
ψ should be classified as an ontic variable. [55,
p. 6; emphasis in original]
Hence the assumption of state independence may be
considered as justified (or -fiable); the introduction of state
dependence conceptually undermines the very idea behind
ψ-epistemicity in the OM-approach.
Nevertheless, Schlosshauer and Fine’s conclusions on
the impact of the PBR theorem remain de-emphasizing:
PBR show that state-independent models of
composites formed using systems with mixed
[ψ-epistemic – FB] models face restrictions. It
is vital to see that those restrictions do not im-
ply any difficulty for models of the components
themselves. The PBR theorem is not a no-go
theorem for the component systems[...]. [54,
p. 4 ff.; my emphasis – FB]
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And indeed, the theorem is not concerned with several
quantum states of a single system, but only has an impact
on overlapping epistemic states via the detour of using
product states of compound systems. One may jump in at
multiple points and criticize the assumptions that bridge
the gap, as we have just seen. Moreover, Lewis et al. [31]
actually have provided two variants of a ψ-epistemic model
which become possible in case (P.-Indep.) is dropped.26
But the models are utterly formal, and they also concede:
None of these models is intuitive or motivated
by physical principles or considerations. The
primary motivation for exploring the possibil-
ity of ψ-epistemic models is to understand the
formal limitations of reproducing quantum the-
ory from a deeper theory. [31, p. 4]
Their conclusion w.r.t. the latter aim is that “any
similar no-go theorem will also require nontrivial assump-
tions beyond those required for a well-formed ontological
model.” [31, p. 1] We can take from this that, while re-
stricting the possibility of ψ-epistemic models, the PBR
theorem (and similar results) should not count as a full
no-go theorem for these models, in the sense of demon-
strating their impossibility. They all rely on additional
assumptions and can hence maximally limit the attrac-
tiveness of ψ-epistemic hidden variable models, or more
precisely, show their incompatibility with these very as-
sumptions.
Regarding the existence of other such theorems, the
PBR paper has indeed caused a whole landslide of publi-
cations which put forward theorems purportedly showing
the impossibility of ψ-epistemic models (so, in fact, their
incompatibility with other plausible assumptions).27 One
such theorem that we should now take a closer look at is
that of Hardy [45]. This will give us a chance to directly
confront some of the purported achievements of Spekkens’
toy model.
4.2. Hardy’s Theorem
The gist of Hardy’s theorem can best be captured by
appeal to an interferometry example like the ones we had
met with in section 3.3.
In Hardy’s own words, the argument based on the fol-
lowing example amounts to a “version of the popular argu-
ment for something going both ways[...].” [45, p. 6] Con-
sider, in contrast to the Mach-Zehnder example we have
discussed in section 3.3, an altered setup where the source
of photons is placed somewhere along the upper route (cf.
26They do not use our formal reconstruction of preparation in-
dependence in their article though, but instead give the informal
characterization that “situations where quantum theory assigns in-
dependent product states are presumed to be completely describable
by independently combining the two purportedly deeper descriptions
for each system.” [31, p. 1]
27A partial survey of the developments up to the year 2014 can be
found in [12].
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Figure 5: (a) is the Mach-Zehnder setup as discussed in sec-
tion 3.3. In (b) the photon is emitted somewhere along the
upper trajectory, whence the phase shifter in the lower trajec-
tory should have no effect.
figure 5 (b)). In this altered setup, it should not mat-
ter whether the beam splitter is inserted or not; whereas
in the original Mach-Zehnder example we would obtain
either − |↘〉 or |↗〉 at the end of the interferometer, de-
pending on whether the phase shifter was in or not, we
will here simply have
UˆH σˆx |↗〉 = UˆH |↘〉 = 1√
2
(|↗〉 − |↘〉), (10)
whence detection at d1 and d2 will be equiprobable.
Now consider the state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↗〉 + |↘〉) as pre-
pared by the first beam splitter in the setup of figure 5 (a),
and the state |φ〉 = |↗〉 as prepared by the source in the
setup of figure 5 (b). These two states are non-orthogonal
and hence could well be taken to have overlapping sup-
ports in a ψ-epistemic model. In this context, we can un-
derstand this claim such that it is not impossible for the
first beam splitter to prepare a photon which is actually
traveling up, and that |ψ〉 is again just indicative of our
lack of knowledge about the true state, i.e. the true path
the photon takes.
But then it should make no difference for the photons
actually traveling up whether the phase shifter is inserted
in the lower path or not. Thus, denote the full set of
true states associated with |φ〉 by Λ|φ〉, and the subset of
those resulting in a click in detector d1 or detector d2 by
Λd1|φ〉 and Λ
d2
|φ〉 respectively. One can also associate a given
setting of the phase shifter (in or out) to these sets, which
we indicate (following [45, p. 6]) by the notation Λ
dj
|φ〉[θ]
(j ∈ {1, 2}, θ ∈ {0, pi}). But since the choice of θ as 0 or
pi should not alter the behavior of the photon going along
the upper path, we obtain a kind of invariance:
Λ
dj
|φ〉 = Λ
dj
|φ〉[θ = 0] = Λ
dj
|φ〉[θ = pi], j ∈ {1, 2}. (INVAR)
Assume that the photon is bound to end up in one of
the detectors—neglecting, of course, experimental errors,
i.e., photons getting absorbed somewhere along the way
or detectors not firing upon incidence—whence it should
hold that
Λ|φ〉 = Λ
d1
|φ〉 ∪ Λd2|φ〉, (TOT)
irrespective of the choice of θ. Now consider the set of true
states Λ|ψ〉 associated with |ψ〉 (the state prepared by the
first beam splitter). We had established above that in case
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the phase shifter is in (θ = pi), the state |ψ〉 will not result
in any clicks in detector d1. Thus it should hold that
Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd1|φ〉[θ = pi] = ∅
⇔ Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd1|φ〉 = ∅, (11)
where the equivalence follows from (INVAR). Analogously,
in case the phase shifter is out (θ = 0), there will be no
clicks in detector d2 if |ψ〉 is prepared, so that
Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd2|φ〉[θ = 0] = ∅
⇔ Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd2|φ〉 = ∅. (12)
But from (TOT), (11), and (12) it now follows that Λ|ψ〉∩
Λ|φ〉 = ∅, whence there is no intersection in the sets of
true states associated with the two non-orthogonal states
|ψ〉 and |φ〉. This in turn means that the epistemic states
for the two preparation methods associated with |ψ〉 and
|φ〉 cannot have overlapping supports. Thus, it seems, this
situation cannot be understood ψ-epistemically [45, p. 7-
9].
Of course this is not yet a no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic
OMs but merely an example. In the remainder of his pa-
per, Hardy provides a generalization, first for finite Hilbert
spaces, for which it is shown that non-orthogonal states
with a certain lower bound quantum probability | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2
(which depends on the dimension of the Hilbert space)
will result in distributions with non-overlapping supports
(pp. 9-13). For an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, the
result is then shown to hold regardless of the quantum
probability (p. 12). For a rigorous, general proof one of
course needs to abstract from beam splitters, mirrors, and
phase shifters. The phase shifter, for instance, is replaced
by a general unitary transformation with some general pa-
rameter m to be varied (instead of the phase shift θ) [45,
p. 10 ff.].
But of course, a few crucial assumptions also have to
be made to run this proof, just as in the PBR case. For
the proof of Hardy’s theorem the following two principles
have to be assumed [cf. 45, pp. 4-5]:
Possibilistic Completeness (PC). The ontic state, λ, is
sufficient to determine whether any outcome of any mea-
surement has probability equal to zero of occurring or not.
Restcricted Ontic Indifference (ROD). Any quantum
transformation on a system which leaves a particular given
pure quantum state, |0〉, unchanged can be implemented
in such a way that it does not affect the underlying ontic
states, λ ∈ Λ|0〉, in the ontic support of |0〉.
Note that Hardy first assumes a stronger principle of
ontic indifference, which is supposed to hold for any arbi-
trary quantum state |ψ〉 instead of a particular one (|0〉).
He then demonstrates that the weaker principle (ROD) is
sufficient to run the proof [45, p. 12]. The ‘ontic support’
is of course the support of the epistemic state, i.e., the
set of true states λ which may result from the preparation
procedure associated with |ψ〉. (PC) is also a rather weak
principle, since the true state only determines whether an
outcome has probability zero or not, instead of determin-
ing the exact probability.28
We have seen both of these principles at work in the
example considered above. (PC) is used to define the sets
of states which may give rise to a detection by d1 or d2
respectively. (ROD) is invoked in assuming that (INVAR)
holds, i.e. that it does not make a difference to the pho-
ton traveling in the upper path whether the phase shifter
is inserted or not. The assumption is akin to a kind of
locality constraint, as Hardy himself notes [45, p. 3], i.e.
informally: whether something is done in some region A
should not immediately influence what happens in some
none-overlapping region B. But of course we know that
such an assumption becomes iffy in the context of QM, and
hence it is doubtworthy whether any hidden variable model
which purports to reproduce QM’s predictions should re-
spect it.
The critical reader will object that we have seen Spek-
kens’ toy model reproduce interferometer examples like the
one considered in this section. Is the toy model non-local?
Prima facie the answer here is ‘no’, but only on the price
of accommodating a non-trivial ‘vacuum state’, akin to
that of quantum field theory (QFT) into the ontology pre-
supposed by the model. Thus Hardy writes:29
[T]here are ontic variables associated with the
occupation number of the path (take this to be
0 or 1) and a phase associated with the path
(take this to be 0 or pi). Even if the occupa-
tion number is 0 there is still the phase variable
which will be affected by a phase shifter. Thus
a path with no particle in it still has nontrivial
degrees of freedom associated with it. This al-
lows the model to violate ontic indifference in
a local way. [45, pp. 14-18]
And Leifer similarly thinks that it is possible to save
the interference examples from the consequences of Hardy’s
theorem in this fashion:
From quantum field theory, we know that the
vacuum is not a featureless void, but has some
sort of structure. Therefore, it makes sense
that, at the ontological level, there might be
more than one ontic state associated with the
vacuum, and a transformation that does not
affect things localized [in one arm of an inter-
ferometer – FB] might still act nontrivially on
28The intuition behind the use of ‘possibility’ in the name of (PC)
is certainly that the true state determines whether an outcome is
possible at all. But this is obviously not correct, as probability zero
is not synonymous with something being impossible on all accounts
of probability. The limit frequency of an event in an infinite random
sequence may be zero even though this event is not impossible.
29Here he is referring especially to elaborations from a talk given
by Spekkens [47].
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these vacuum ontic states. [...] A transfor-
mation acting locally on [one arm – FB] can
then switch the ontic states, in violation of on-
tic indifference, whilst leaving the distribution
invariant. [12, p. 121; my emphasis – FB]
So not: ‘something goes both ways’, but rather: ‘for
each way there is something which goes it’. But this anal-
ysis still has a foul taste to it and may strike us as some-
what in conflict with Spekkens’ model. The reason is that
here, for the first time, an appeal to the very nature of
the true states is made, whereas the treatment so far has
been entirely neutral on the subject. This may not be the
biggest problem yet (indeed, we indicated that the model
should at least allow for a specification of the nature of the
true states), but the true states which are invoked as ex-
planatory are ‘borrowed’ from QM (more precisely: QFT),
whereas so far QM was treated as precisely not conveying a
suitable ontology of the microcosm. Recall that Spekkens
claims that: “The key is that one can hope to identify
phenomena that are characteristic of states of incomplete
knowledge regardless of what this knowledge is about.”
[37, p. 2] The interferometer example does obviously not
constitute an example of incomplete knowledge, regardless
of what this knowledge is about. For this example to make
sense, one either has to commit to a direct influence be-
tween the two arms of the interferometer (which would
violate the otherwise ‘local’ spirit of the model), or one
has to construct a specific kind of true state reminiscent
of the vaccuum state from QFT, in order for the model to
make sense.
5. Discussion: Prospects of an EE View of Quan-
tum States
What can we say about the plausibility of an EE view,
in particular as presented in the form of ψ-epistemic OMs?
To recall, the appeal of an EE view is that it is very nat-
ural and spares us a great deal of metaphysical compli-
cation. The appeal of the OM approach, on the other
hand, is that it provides, in this context, a concrete formal
framework to accommodate ‘Einsteinian’ intuitions, and
apparently allows to implement them in such a way that
certain ‘problematic’ predictions of QM are preserved or
reproduced.
Timpson, however, has objected that opting for hidden-
variables in general
is unlikely to be attractive to anyone who is
trying to appeal to information as a way of
avoiding the problems caused by the seemingly
odd behaviour of the quantum state. The aim,
roughly speaking, was to circumvent the prob-
lems associated with collapse or nonlocality by
arguments of the form: there’s not really any
physical collapse, just a change in our knowl-
edge; there’s not really any nonlocality, it’s
only Alice’s knowledge of (information about)
Bob’s system that changes when she performs
a measurement on her half of an EPR pair. But
we all know that if we are to have hidden vari-
ables lurking around then these are going to
be very badly behaved indeed in quantum me-
chanics (nonlocality, contextuality). [56, pp. 146-
147; emphasis omitted]
Of course the appeal here is to such theorems as that
of Bell [28] or of Kochen and Specker [57], and in the
light of these one may ask: why even bother with hidden
variables in the context of epistemic interpretations in the
first place? In addition to these well known results we have
here considered more specific no-gos aimed directly at ψ-
epistemic models formulated in the OM approach. But
we have argued that the impact of the influential PBR
theorem may be compensated, and we have outlined some
achievements of a ψ-epistemic toy model (and its more
general spin off) in reproducing certain quantum phenom-
ena and predictions from the mere assumption of epistemic
restrictions. So what about these achievements?
As for quantum interference, we have seen that Spekkens
can reproduce interference examples with his toy model,
but that in the light of Hardy’s theorem, one has to intro-
duce specific elements into the model, namely what Leifer
calls ‘vacuum ontic states’, in order to produce an em-
pirically adequate model without admitting non-locality.
However, appealing to these vacuum ontic states may not
be a recommendable move for the following reasons.
First we must ask what a vacuum ontic state actually
is. Of course this concept is supposed to incorporate the
quantum field theoretic vacuum in the OM approach, but
the vacuum in QFT is a theoretical concept, i.e., what a
‘vaccum state’ is “cannot be fully specified by a single
definition, but only by the joint effect of the core axioms
of a theory.” [58, p. 2; emphasis in original]
To make a case, consider the discussion of theoretical
concepts by Schurz and Gebharter, who use the concept
of force in Newtonian physics as a paradigmatic example,
which is defined, according to them, only by the joint ax-
ioms of Newtonian mechanics. A vacuum state is equally
only defined by its role as the state of lowest eigenvalue
for a given energy operator of some particular quantized
field theory, and hence by the joint assumptions of the
theory instead of one single theory-independent definition;
and compare this also to individual forces being defined in
terms of particular differential equations and initial con-
ditions for given physical problems. This dependence on
a given field theory goes so far as to lead to two phys-
ically inequivalent vacui in the case of the Unruh effect
[cf. e.g. 59], for two observers who are non-inertially re-
lated to one another; and this may be compared to ‘ficti-
cious forces’ in Newtonian mechanics, which equally result
from coordinate transformations between relatively non-
inertial frames. It appears that no general, all-applying
definition of the term ‘vacuum state’ as used in QFT can
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be given, so that the situation is indeed comparable to
that of Newtonian force. This should give some credibility
for considering ‘vacuum state’ as a theoretical concept of
QFT in the aforementioned sense.
Thus what a vacuum ontic state is is far from clear.
It must be a new concept, peculiar to a specific model,
or rather: a suitable theory formulated by appeal to the
OM approach, or a suitable replacement thereof. Without
such a theory, the concept is not well-defined. But even
on an intuitive level, the appeal seems completely ad hoc,
and one must wonder why it is introduced other than to
facilitate certain philosophical preconceptions.
What is (at least) equally bad, is that in algebraic QFT
(AQFT), there is the Reeh-Schlieder theorem [60], which
says that for an open bounded region O ⊂ R4 of space-
time and Aˆ(O) an element of the algebra generated from
all possible combinations of adjoints, sums, and products
of operators φˆ(f) :=
∫
d4x f(x)φˆ(x), f ∈ C∞0 (O), the set
of vectors Aˆ(O) |Ω〉 is dense in the space H of state vectors
(|Ω〉 the vacuum state). This means that one can approx-
imate (arbitrarily close) any state |ψ〉 by operations local
to O, even if |ψ〉 has implications for regions O′ at a space-
like distance to O [cf. 61, p. S497 ff.]. Most importantly,
the theorem thus “demonstrates”, as Dieks puts it, “that
the vacuum, and all other states of bounded energy, have
long-distance correlations built into them. It is therefore
not surprising to find that Bell inequalities are violated in
these states—a standard sign of non-locality.” [62, p. 216]
Here Dieks of course refers to the work of Werner and
Summers, who found, in the 1980s, “that already the vac-
uum fluctuations assure a maximal violation of Bell’s in-
equalities for the appropriate detectors.” [63, pp. 258-259]
Thus, any notion of ‘vacuum ontic states’ that is suffi-
ciently close to the QFT-notion of a vacuum state defects
the apparent locality of the interferometer examples—be-
cause the element of QFT appealed to in order to restore lo-
cality is itself a decisive expression of quantum non-locality.
One might object that these implications follow only
from the highly theoretical algebraic version of QFT, and
that in practice, the canonical quantization approach is
all that is needed. This worry gains support by Wal-
lace’s observation that “no examples are known of AQFT-
compatible interacting field theories, and in particular the
standard model cannot at present be made AQFT-compa-
tible.” [64, p. 33] Thus it may be suspected that these
consequences of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem have no bear-
ing on experimental practice and hence do not have to be
taken seriously, in virtue of a lack of empirical accessibility.
But similar worries were originally raised w.r.t. the strong
non-local correlations predicted by ordinary QM (most no-
tably by Schro¨dinger [26, p. 166]), and if there is anything
we can learn from this example, it is that one is better off
not to dismiss the implications of the quantum formalism
easily.
However, the situation is a bit more subtle in the case
of testing vacuum entanglement, since, as Werner and
Summers put it, “there would be experimental difficulties
[...][because] the violation of Bell’s inequality must vanish
exponentially with the spatial separation of [two separate
spacetime regions] on the length scale determined by the
Compton wavelength of the lightest particle of the theory.”
[63, p. 259]
There are suggestions for other kinds of experiments in
which vacuum states crucially enter into entangled states
though, namely states entangled with those of a single
photon. Examples of such experimental protocols are dis-
cussed, for instance, in [65] or [66]. Typically these schemes
are used to show that even a single particle is ‘nonlocal’
in a sense, as noticed already by Einstein in his examples
discussed at the 1927 Solvay conference [cf. 67, pp. 115-
116].
Despite some original controversy [cf. 68, p. 2 ff. for
discussion] today there is a broad consensus that particular
experiments can be used to test exactly for this ‘single
particle nonlocality’ which involves entanglement with the
vacuum, and the experiments that have been performed
are reported to provide affirmations of the predictions [69,
70].
Provisios about the interpretation of the cited experi-
ments aside, we hence have good theoretical and empirical
reasons to suspect that quantum vacuum states are just
the kind of states which involve the problematic nonlo-
cal correlations. In the light of these features of the QFT
vacuum, we are lead to judge that the advocate of an EE
view is faced with the following dilemma: if he appeals
to vacuum states in close analogy to the vacuum state of
QFT, then he has neither provided a local explanation of
quantum interference phenomena after all, nor (more im-
portantly) followed his program of construing QM states
as indicative of preparations and measurements only. If,
on the other hand, he postulates a new kind of nontrivial
vacuum, inspired by certain experimental results, he has
merely shifted the burden from explaining interference to
explaining these new kinds of states, together with all the
empirical data that we have about QFT’s vacuum states.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the bullet
is being bitten by taking the second horn of the dilemma
and accepting a new kind of vacuum state, peculiar to a
suitable ψ-epistemic OM (a thorough extension of Spekkens’
model, say). Then we are lead to wonder: if such re-
markable and remarkably counterintuitive results which
can be derived from quantum theory are simply presup-
posed instead of explained and use-novelly predicted by a
ψ-epistemic model, what good is the model then?
Bartlett et al. in fact delineate their aim in seeking
out epistemic models as follows: “it is only by describing
a broad landscape of possible theories that we can specify
the sense in which quantum theory is special.” [22, p. 3]
This is, indeed, an important task, and the OM approach
in particular has already served to sort out some gos and
no-gos for interpreting QM. But if this is the only pur-
pose of ψ-epistemic (and asorted) models, then they will
not help us solve (or resolve) the conceptual difficulties
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arising from the MP in QM by appeal to a mere lack of
knowledge about otherwise well-defined and independently
existing entities and their states—in other words: they will
not sketch a route to an interpretation that preserves the
Einsteinian intuitions.
Einstein viewed the QM of his time as “no useful point
of departure for future development” [71, p. 87], and since
the point of departure for the ψ-epistemic interpretations
under consideration are Einsteinian worries, it must be
seen as a ‘partial surrender’ to QM if the only purpose
of certain models is to show how QM is special. From an
Einsteinian point of view, the aim must rather be to search
for serious alternatives because QM is ‘too special’.
One of Einstein’s core intuitions clearly was locality or
local causality (“Prinzip der Nahwirkung” [72, p. 322]),
which he held most dearly as a scientific principle (“A
complete rejection of this principle would make the idea of
the existence of (quasi-)closed systems and thereby the es-
tablishment of empirically testable laws in the sense famil-
iar to us impossible.” [ibid.; my translation – FB]).30 So
what about Spekkens’ analysis of certain entangled states,
which seemed to indicate that entanglement and correla-
tions in remote measurement outcomes may also crucially
involve a previous lack of knowledge about the true states
of the systems involved? In fact, Bartlett et al., in a similar
vein, model “maximal bipartite entanglement in [restricted
Liouville] mechanics [...] by an epistemic state that de-
scribes perfect correlations between the pair of systems.”
[22, p. 8] In particular, they use a probability distribu-
tion µcorrAB (qA, pA, qB , pB) ∝ δ(qA− qB)δ(pA+pB) as phase
space distribution for two systems A and B for which it
is known that qA − qB = 0 and pA + pB = 0, i.e. which
satisfy the conditions of the original EPR thought exper-
iment [cf. 73]. Marginalizing for the coordinates of one of
the two systems leads to a uniform distribution, so that
nothing is known about the true states of the single sys-
tems, but only relational properties of the joint system are
known (the total values for position and momentum).
But this relational knowledge implies that in virtue of
her prior knowledge of the value of the total momentum
of the two systems, Alice, say, can determine the momen-
tum value for Bob’s system at once, after measuring mo-
mentum on her system, and analogously for position. In
essence, we here get the same kind of informational update
in consequence of a measurement on the total system, and
thus just as the epistemic state in Spekkens’ qubit-like toy
model mirrored the properties of measurements on an en-
tangled qubit state, the distribution in the restricted ver-
sion of Liouville mechanics mirrors the properties of mea-
surements on the original EPR-state.31 And upon learning
the value of Bob’s position measurement (say), Alice can
30German original: “Vo¨llige Aufhebung dieses Grundsatzes wu¨rde
die Idee von der Existenz (quasi-)abgeschlossener Systeme und damit
die Aufstellung empirisch pru¨fbarer Gesetze in dem uns gela¨ufigen
Sinne unmo¨glich machen.”
31There are, however, a few well known difficulties with the ac-
tual preparation and measurement of EPR states in the sense of the
infer, on the basis of her own momentum measurement, the
complete phase space coordinates (qA, pA) at once, which
makes EPR’s original point.
In summary, as Bartlett et al. put it:
All that changes as a result of this measure-
ment is how the observer refines her knowledge
of the ontic state of particle B. She either re-
fines her knowledge of its position or she refines
her knowledge of its momentum. No ‘spooky
action at a distance’ is required to understand
the EPR experiment if one adopts the inter-
pretation offered by [restricted Liouville] me-
chanics. [22, p. 12]
Both examples, that of Spekkens and that of Bartlett
et al., are indeed suggestive. But they are suggestive of
something false. It is not that quantum non-locality can
be explained in terms of knowledge in general. It is only
by selectively choosing particular states which can be mir-
rored by ordinary probability distributions that one can
create the illusion that this is possible. This is exactly the
gist of Bell’s theorem—that quantum (anti-)correlations
are not like those between Bertlmann’s socks [11]. Indeed,
admittedly none of the models can reproduce violations of
Bell-type inequalities or the like:
The toy theory is, by construction, a local and
noncontextual hidden variable theory. Thus, it
cannot possibly capture all of quantum theory.
In the face of these no-go theorems, a propo-
nent of the epistemic view is forced to accept
alternative possibilities for the nature of the
ontic states to which our knowledge pertains
in quantum theory. [37, pp. 24-25]
We emphasize that we are not arguing that a
ψ-epistemic local hidden variable model could
explain all quantum correlations, only that the
particular correlations described in the EPR
experiment can be so explained (in precisely
the way that EPR suggested they should). This
is not at odds with Bell’s theorem because the
correlations in the EPR experiment do not vio-
late a Bell inequality.32 Of course, because it is
original paper: the state is not time dependent, and the descriptions
used to set up the argument for incompleteness would only be valid
at t = 0, whereas time evolution makes it unstable; and since a plane
wave representation is used, there would be non-vanishing probabil-
ity of the two particles being basically anywhere in space, so that
the assumption of spatial separatedness is actually unwarranted [cf.
74, p. 13]. However, Praxmeyer et al. have constructed a scheme in
which the EPR state appears as the limit of a two-mode squeezed
state, and observables on it are considered which can be used to
violate a Bell-type inequality [75].
32Depending on the specific setup used to implement the states
appealed to in the EPR paper, this becomes a debatable claim; cf.
footnote 31.
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locally causal by construction, [restricted Liou-
ville] mechanics cannot hope to reproduce Bell-
inequality violations. Such violations are one
of the quantum phenomena that [restricted Li-
ouville] mechanics emphatically cannot repro-
duce, not even qualitatively. [22, pp. 24-25]
It seems clear that at the very least this core intuition
of Einstein (local causality) must be dropped in any em-
pirically adequate ψ-epistemic model.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a recent and influen-
tial approach that outlines paths to an epistemic reading
of QM, and we have scrutinized its capability to provide
specific models (ψ-epistemic models) that are compatible
with ‘Einsteinian’ intuitions. To this end, the one for-
mal model (Spekkens’ toy model) that so far has brought
about the clearest conceptual successes in this direction
was investigated in some detail, and a spin off for contin-
uous degrees of freedom in all brevity. Subsequently, two
recent no-go theorems were analyzed for their impact on
the whole project.
We have found that the influential PBR theorem poses
less of a threat than may be believed by some, but that
it has spawned off an important debate and a plethora
of further no-go theorems. We found Hardy’s theorem,
in particular, to pose a threat to certain achievements of
Spekkens’ toy model, a model that is sometimes considered
to provide a plausibilization of an EE view. In particu-
lar certain apparent successes of this model were demon-
strated to rest on a selective choice of examples and/or to
involve ad hoc moves to such curiosities as ‘vacuum ontic
states’. We have argued that (i) ‘vacuum ontic state’ is
effectively a theoretical concept without a proper theory,
that (ii) such states may involve problematic features of
non-locality (thus forestalling a local explanation of quan-
tum interference in terms of hidden variables, as Spekkens’
model is believed to deliver [45, 12]), and that (iii) an ap-
peal to them should be considered illegitimate in virtue of
(i), if quantum states (including vacuum states |Ω〉) are
merely P/M-states. Given that Spekkens’ model achieves
a plausibilization of an EE view, these and similar argu-
ments should count as a deplausibilization.
Moreover, we have found that the prima facie expla-
nations of specific EPR/Bell-examples in terms of incom-
plete knowledge were problematically selective, and that
they eschewed the lesson of Bertlmann’s socks. What we
can see from all of this is that any meaningful OM is bound
to look like QM itself in important respects, and that if
one strives for an ontology in addition to the instrumen-
tal/operational content of QM, then the quantum state is
probably not ‘all and only epistemic’. All the creativity
and formal elegance used in the general approach and the
particular models discussed above apparently cannot bring
us past this point. Indeed, more recently also Spekkens,
holding firm to an epistemic view of the quantum state,
has conceded that
the investigation of [epistemically restricted]
theories is best considered as a first step in
a larger research program wherein the frame-
work of ontological models [...] is ultimately
rejected, but where one holds fast to the no-
tion that a quantum state is epistemic. [76,
p. 7]
We have here focused on the difficulties of an EE view
of quantum states in spite of plausibilization strategies,
and there are of course also aspects of QM that Spekkens’
model and its continuous successor can handle much bet-
ter than those focused on here [cf. in particular 1, for dis-
cussion]. But quantum interference (being the method of
choice to test for coherent superposition) and non-local
correlations are arguably the most important quantum
phenomena, and if these are not reproduced or only in
a very unsatisfactory and ad hoc fashion, it is not clear
that the models discussed can serve as evidence for an
EE view after all. Additionally, we once more emphasize
that conceptually meaningful models which also fully re-
produce QM are missing entirely to date, Spekkens’ toy
model and its successor for continuous degrees of freedom
being maybe the closest calls. But notably even these two
models do not at all explain what the true states λ are, or
how they bring about the puzzling quantum statistics and
correlations; they merely stipulate their existence. The
formally successful models, on the other hand, in particu-
lar that of Lewis et al. [31], appear, in philosophers’ terms,
gerrymandered.
We must conclude at this point that the MP (to date)
cannot be solved (or avoided) in the way we have called
‘natural’, i.e. by depriving quantum states of their ‘on-
ticity’ and seeking for a deeper description in terms of
hidden variables, more in accord with classical intuitions.
This point remains throughout the decades, and it is due
to a conflict with confirmed empirical predictions of QM.
If the problems associated with QM are a matter of knowl-
edge in some sense, then this knowledge still is knowledge
about something rather peculiar. Thus if one is to have an
epistemic interpretation of QM, one will either (a) have to
accommodate quite a few features of QM into the under-
lying ontology, or (b) look to the other camp of epistemic
interpretations, the BE ones (as advocated, e.g., in [77]).
An interesting route to (a) is hinted at in [21]. Harrigan
and Spek-kens refer to the possibility of reading Bohmian
mechanics in the sense that the quantum state, ψ, of any
subsystem of the universe is taken to be epistemic, whereas
the quantum state of the whole universe, Ψ, is ‘nomolog-
ical’, as is advocated in particular by Du¨rr et al. [78,
pp. 266 ff.]. The main reason for this distinction is that
ψ is subject to change, whereas Ψ need not be (if it is
a solution to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, say; [cf. 78,
pp. 268-269]), and laws of nature supposedly should not
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change. But this approach to (a) seems problematic as
well. If Ψ describes a law of nature, then it is either part
of an ontology (in all realistic and non-Humean views) and
hence at least the quantum state of the universe is non-
epistemic, or, on a Humean such as that of Lewis, say,
it should be a regularity appearing in a ‘best system’, a
system that “strikes as good a balance as truth will allow
between simplicity and strength” [79, p. 478], and therefor
could be interpreted epistemically as well. Since Ψ is then
a mere regularity though, this would, among other things,
imply that particles simply correlate their behavior in cer-
tain experiments—they just do.33 More importantly, since
there is no such best system to date in which Ψ appears,
it would be no one’s epistemic state. In any case, a good
story needs to be told here as well.
As a final remark to option (b), we note that in BE
approaches the assumptions of (selective) scientific and
metaphysical realism become iffy, because if we cannot
even entertain dummy descriptions λ to refer to the true
configurations of that which is investigated in experiments,
it indeed becomes at the very least unspeakable [81]. Put
frankly, if the quantum state is not the true state of the
system, and there is also no additional true state λ, then
maybe there is no true state of the system. This is not only
in defiance of the semantic condition of scientific realism,
but it also raises doubts about the very existence (in a
mind-, language-, and theory-independent sense) of fun-
damental physical entities, and thus about metaphysical
realism.
As regards the main subject of this paper, we may
sum up the worries at this point with a mutilated version
of one of Einstein’s own comments on Schro¨dinger’s wave
mechanics:
The successes of [Harrigan and Spekkens’] the-
ory make a great impression, and yet [we] do
not know whether it is question [sic] of any-
thing more than the old quantum rules [...].
Has one really come closer to a solution of the
riddle? (after Einstein 1926; as cited in [82,
pp. 83-84])
Maybe Bohr will win this one too...
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